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The deteriorating societal conditions that have accompanied the implementation 
of the neoliberal model in Latin America have been well documented.  This analysis 
draws heavily on this work to identify the emergence of de-industrialization, 
displacement of food production, exclusion of basic human services, and excessive 
unemployment following the application of neoliberal reform.  Such ill effects have 
ushered in a strong anti-neoliberal current that has opened up new spaces for discussion 
and debate about alternative development models for the region. Perhaps the most radical 
alternative to emerge is the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).  ALBA’s 
architects have been explicit in their denunciation of neoliberalism and insist that ALBA 
is an alternative that has been designed to rectify the ills associated with neoliberal 
reform. The following analysis examines ALBA as an alternative idea and practice of 
development.  The following analysis examines the ways in which ALBA is formulated 
as an abstract alternative to neoliberalism and highlights the concrete policies and 
projects that distinguish it from the defining aspects of the neoliberal model.  
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The devastating effects of neoliberalism on the economic and social development 
of Latin America have been well documented (Peet and Hartwick 1999, Petras and 
Veltmeyer 2001, Petras Veltmeyer and Vieux 1997, Dello Buono and Bell Lara 2007).  In 
many instances, the application of the neoliberal model has brought Latin American 
nations to the brink of economic collapse.  The deteriorating quality of life that has 
accompanied this model of development (e.g., increasing poverty and inequality, loss of 
formal employment, loss of basic public services, and food shortages) has harvested a 
wave of resistance that has spread across all of Latin America.  Massive street protests 
have resulted in successive overthrows of multiple governments dedicated to 
neoliberalism, including Peru (2000), Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2003, 2005), and 
Ecuador (2000, 2005), and many leftist leaders who fervently campaigned against the 
neoliberal model have been swept into power at the ballot box- Chavez in Venezuela, 
Morales in Bolivia, Correa in Ecuador, Ortega in Nicaragua, and Lugo in Paraguay.   
The anti-neoliberal current has opened up new spaces for discussion and debate 
about alternative development strategies in the region. Dello Buono and Bell Lara 
(2007:73) point out that there is an “increasing urgency”, by a “growing consensus”,  “to 
define a regional development agenda that responds to the demands and interests of the 
people.” It is within this context that scholars have focused their attention on the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) (Dello Buono and Bell Lara 2007, 
Foster 2007, Harris and Azzi 2006).  ALBA (named after Simon Bolivar, the 19th century 
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revolutionary that liberated South America from Spanish rule) is a regional trading block 
established between Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, and Honduras in 
direct response to the long-term economic decline generated by neoliberalism.  ALBA’s 
representatives have characterized it as a project based on regional solidarity, directed 
toward fostering sustainable development through regional economic integration.   
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine ALBA as an alternative idea and practice 
of development.  In this analysis I will examine the ways in which ALBA is formulated as 
an abstract alternative and highlight the concrete policies and projects that distinguish it 
from the defining aspects of the neoliberal model.  
The methodological approach taken in this thesis is an historical sociological one. 
Much of the analysis therefore relies on secondary data including: books, journal articles, 
government documents.  The thesis also builds on empirical material about ALBA that 
was gathered from official ALBA documents, journal articles, and key newspaper and 
periodical reports about ALBA. 1  
Below, I provide a historical overview of the emergence of the neoliberal model 
in Latin America by highlighting the global political and economic developments that 
lead to its materialization. I pay particular attention to Venezuela throughout this thesis 
because of its leading role in the formation of ALBA. This historical analysis begins with 
an overview of Latin America’s first attempt at establishing sustainable economic 
development through import substitution industrialization (ISI).  I explain why the ISI 
model ultimately failed, and how neoliberalism emerged as the “logical and rational” 
                                                 
1 With respect to official ALBA documents written in Spanish (these include ALBA 2005, ALBA 2006, 
ALBA 2007, ALBA 2008, ALBA 2008a) I relied heavily on internet-assisted translations.  However,  no 
direct quotations were taken from these translations.  
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alternative.  Although, neoliberals argue that ISI was destined to fail because of heavy 
state intervention and protectionism, the following analysis reveals that the principal 
challenges of ISI resulted from the dissolution of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
system, not the microeconomic devices of the ISI model (Soederberg 2004, Gowan 1999, 
Rodrik 1998.       
Next, I describe the neoliberal model of development in detail, both as an abstract 
theoretical concept and in its concrete manifestations in Latin America.  This is followed 
by a discussion of the widespread effects of neoliberal structural reform on the economic 
development and societal conditions of the region.  Although there has been no standard 
application of the neoliberal model, I identify three main elements that have consistently 
accompanied its implementation since the 1990s: trade liberalization, privatization, and 
financial deregulation.  The effects of these structural reforms have varied among Latin 
American nations. Nevertheless, this analysis reveals the occurrence of widespread 
patterns with respect to the trajectory and stability of economic and social development. 
More specifically, this analysis identifies the emergence of de-industrialization, 
displacement of food production, exclusion of basic human services, and excessive 
unemployment after the implementation of these reforms.  Following this discussion, I 
highlight the emergence of the anti-neoliberal current throughout Latin America.   
In the key empirical chapter of the thesis, I compare the features of the ALBA 
model (including the terms and conditions of trade, joint ventures, and finance) with 
features of the neoliberal model (i.e., trade liberalization privatization, and financial 
deregulation). This comparison is approached first by way of a comparison of the 
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theoretical and ideological approaches that ALBA and neoliberalism offer and second by 
a review of the projects and programs that ALBA is beginning to develop.  The latter 
comparison allows consideration and early assessment of ALBA’s potential to thwart the 
effects associated with neoliberal reform.  I conclude with a short discussion on ALBA’s 
short and medium run potential as a sustainable regional model of development. 
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Chapter 2  
The Development Era in Latin America 
During the postwar period, development strategies took on a practical and 
sustained significance in Latin America, as nations in the region searched for a model of 
development that promoted economic sustainability and enhance their political 
independence.2  By the end of WWII, collective negotiations directed toward 
reestablishing international trade and promoting economic growth and stability between 
the world’s capitalist powers were underway.  Because the productive and technological 
capacities of Great Britain, France, and Germany had been weakened or destroyed in the 
war, the United States emerged as the world’s most powerful industrial nation.  Despite 
the shared emphasis on peace and stability between nations, the United States had no 
intention of relinquishing its newly established position as the world’s dominant power.  
Its position of superiority allowed the United States to take the leading role in establishing 
the terms and conditions of the postwar settlement.3  Central to US objectives was the 
reconstruction and expansion of a global market economy that would bring capitalist-style 
economic development to the rest of the world.  To this end, a number of international 
institutions were established.  At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction (more commonly referred to as the World Bank) was established 
to provide much-needed financial assistance for the economic development of war torn 
nations; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to provide short-term lending 
to coordinate currency fluctuations resulting from trade imbalances between capitalist 
                                                 
2 For a thorough discussion of development during the postwar era, see Gilbert Rist, The History of 
Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, London: Zed Books, 1997.    
3 See: David Harvey, The New Imperialism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
6
nations; finally the US dollar, with its exchange price fixed to gold, became the principal 
medium of exchange for all international transactions.    In 1948, at the UN Conference 
on Trade, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) was established to provide 
the terms and conditions of international free trade.4  Overtime, these institutions would 
be increasingly relied upon as US geopolitical interest pushed to reestablish and expand 
international trade. 
Two important events during the post-war period influenced the dynamics of 
capitalist expansion: (1) the politics of the Cold War and (2) the emergence of newly 
independent states in Asia and Africa after the disintegration of European colonial 
empires (So 1990). The biggest perceived threat to capitalist expansion was the Soviet 
Union, which had already established major territorial gains in Europe during the war and 
was now beginning to spread to parts of Asia.  The Soviet threat was two-fold. The first 
part rested upon the fact that the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence kept about one-
third of the world outside the reach of capitalist production, especially resource extraction 
and potential consumer markets. The second part consisted in the fact that the Soviet 
model provided an alternative path to economic development, an alternative that could 
spread to poor independent nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  ALBA, as we 
shall see, represents the continuation of this ideological and material challenge to US 
capital dominance in Latin America.  The preoccupation with the “Soviet threat” obliged 
financial operators to begin directing assistance toward the economic development of 
                                                 
4 Initially GATT was to be instrumental in moving international trade away from the postwar system of 
planned resource allocation. However, due to strong international protectionist forces, it became little more 
than a negotiation forum during the immediate aftermath of its inception (Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 
1997:13).    
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poor nations during the 1960s (Mc Michael 1996).  This was the beginning of what is 
commonly referred to as the “development era”.  From a geopolitical point of view, 
support for development projects provided the opportunity to thwart the expansion of 
communism by gaining support of developing nations and expanding capitalist economic 
relations around the globe.   
The philosophy behind the development project was simple: poor nations would 
need to industrialize if they were to reach the level of prosperity of the developed regions 
of the world (the United States and Western Europe being the most prominent examples) 
(So 1990).  Much of the intellectual justification for development came from the ideas of 
the modernization school, which held that all societies progress along a similar 
evolutionary path of development.  This path of development was viewed as natural and 
progressive (Rostow 1959).  It was comprised of successive stages that ranged from 
“traditional” to “modern”.  Poor nations were characterized as “traditional” societies, 
while Western Europe and the United States were examples of the “modern” stage of 
development.  Somewhere between the traditional and modern stage was the “takeoff” 
stage, which was responsible for propelling societies forward into modernity.  
Industrialization was seen as the necessary element that allowed developing nations to 
“takeoff” in the direction of their more modern counterparts (Rostow 1956).  But in order 
to reach the “takeoff”, developing nations would need a stimulus in the form of a “rise in 
the rate of productive investment” (in an amount that ranged between 5 - 10 percent of the 
national income) and “the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors” 
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(Rostow 1956:32).  Modernization theory matched well with US international policy.  As 
Alvin So (1990:30) notes:  
If the problem facing third countries lies in their lack of productive investment, 
then the solution lies in the provision of aid to these countries- in the form of 
capital, technology, and expertise.  Concurring with Rostow, US policymakers 
therefore viewed American aid as the best way to help Third World countries to 
modernize.  Thus, millions and million of U.S. dollars are loaned each year to 
Third World countries to build infrastructures and manufacturing sectors, and 




Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
It is important to point out that not all development strategies were equally 
committed to modernization theory.  The U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) was largely responsible for formulating development strategies for nations in the 
South.  ECLA strategists were by no means modernization ideologues, but they too 
considered industrial development as part of the answer to Latin America’s economic 
upheavals.  However, the ECLA stressed another important factor that had been largely 
neglected by modernization theorists, i.e., the unfavorable position that developing 
nations had traditionally occupied in the international economy.5   According to ECLA’s 
chief intellectual Raul Prebisch, Latin America’s impediment to building sustainable 
economic growth was rooted in the fact that the region’s economic activity was centered 
on the export of food and raw materials to core regions in exchange for industrial-
produced consumer goods (Prebisch 1950).  In this type of trading arrangement, the 
                                                 
5 Recall that Modernization Theory relied heavily on a state-centered evolutionary model to explain the 
development process.  From this perspective, the fundamental principal that governs the trajectory of 
national development is an evolution (assumingly) inherent to all forms of social organization.   The 
influence of external factors at the international level, such as competition between nation states or 
hegemonic domination, does not factor in.    
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production and consumption of the region was determined by—and dependent on—
particular demands from the core.  Such ‘foreign oriented economic development’, he 
argued, necessarily restricts the internal development of poor nations, while leading to 
declining terms of trade due to the tendency for monopolized international markets to 
lower the price of raw materials.  Prebisch proposed a policy of import-substitution as a 
means to break the region’s dependency on foreign imports, and to direct production 
towards domestic needs.  The idea was for Latin American countries to build industrial 
capacity under the direction and protection of the state so that foreign imports could be 
replaced with products produced domestically.  The policies that governments pursued to 
promote import substitution industrialization (ISI) were broadly similar.  Industrial 
development was encouraged through access to cheap credit and exemption from heavy 
taxation. The traditional export sector was not to be abandoned but instead used as a 
means of acquiring international currency (US dollars) for the import of capital goods 
(i.e., machines and technology to be used by the industrial sector); tariffs and subsidies 
were implemented to protect domestic industry from international competition (Hoffman 
2000).   
During the postwar period, there was great optimism among Latin American 
leaders that ISI would help the region achieve greater economic growth and self-reliance; 
and for good reason, in the decades following, Latin America’s six largest economies 





Table 1: Latin America: Total GDP, 1900-1989 (average annual compound growth rates)6 
 
 
growth rates of the six largest economies in the region exceeded 5 percent. However, by 
the 1980’s the region began experiencing a sharp economic downturn. See: Table 1. 
One of the main reasons why the ISI model of development could not maintain its 
postwar success stemmed from its dependence on international finance for the purchase 
of capital goods (Hoffman 2000, Veltmeyer 2007, SAPRI Report 2004).    
By the late 1970s, Latin American debt had reached crisis proportions.  The 
following historical analysis highlights multiple factors that contributed to Latin 
America’s accumulation of debt, the most significant being the dissolution of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system.  Although the ISI model was dependent on foreign 
finance from the beginning, it was after the removal of the gold standard and international 
capital controls that this dependence increased immensely.  By the early 1980s nations 
were borrowing just to pay the interest on old loans.           
                                                 
6 Maddsion (1995). 
 1900-13 1913-29 1929-50 1950-73 1973-80 1980-89 
Argentina 6.4 3.5 2.5 4.0 3.0 -1.0 
Brazil 4.5 4.7 5.0 6.9 7.2 2.3 
Chile 3.7 2.9 2.2 3.6 2.8 2.9 
Colombia 4.2 4.7 3.6 5.1 5.0 3.3 
Mexico 2.6 0.8 4.0 6.5 6.4 1.4 
Venezuela 3.3 8.2 5.9 6.4 4.1 -0.1 
       
Arithmetic 
Average 4.1 4.1 3.9 5.4 4.8 1.5 
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Dos Santos (1971) highlighted multiple reasons why the ISI model required 
external financing from the outset.  First, developing nations needed foreign currency (US 
dollars) for the import of capital goods and technology.  Unfortunately the traditional 
export sector did not prove to be a stable source of revenue as initially hoped. The price 
of raw materials continued to drop in the international market while the cost of imported 
capital goods steadily rose.  Moreover, the amount of revenue generated from traditional 
exports was volatile and susceptible to the changes in demand of core regions.  Over time, 
the US increasingly lessened its dependence on the exports of developing countries by 
creating synthetic replacements. Third, a great deal of the surplus generated from the 
industrial sector was not channeled back into production but was exported back to core 
regions through patent costs and royalty stipulations that accompanied imported 
technology.  As industrializing nations sent more capital abroad than they were bringing 
in, many depended on foreign finance to maintain the development and expansion of 
industry (ECLAC 1998).     
In the 1970’s Latin America’s efforts to industrialize were confronted with 
additional challenges due to the dissolution of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
system and the 1973 oil crisis.  The removal of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
system in effect, moved the world economy on to a system of freely floating exchange 
rates.  Under the Bretton Woods system, the exchange rate of a country’s currency was 
either directly or indirectly fixed to gold.7  However under the new system, gold was no 
                                                 
7 Since the US had most of the worlds gold at the outset of the postwar period, the dollar was designated as 
the sole currency that would back with $.25 in gold; other countries then backed their currencies in dollars. 
The fact that all currencies were backed either directly or indirectly by a given quantity of gold, meant that 
countries could not freely decide the value of their respective currency and therefore manipulate 
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longer the anchor.  Instead, the paper dollar alone became the international medium of 
exchange. The term used to describe the dollar’s new role in international monetary 
relations is seigniorage.8   With the dollar’s value no longer fixed to gold, its exchange 
rate with other currencies could fluctuate to a considerable extent as the US Treasury 
determined.9     
Since the dollar was still designated as the international medium of exchange to 
which all other currencies were pegged, the international trading power of Latin 
American currencies fluctuated every time the value of the dollar rose or fell (Soederberg 
2004, Gowan 1999).  This meant that if countries were to continue importing technology 
and machinery for the maintenance and development of industry, they would need to 
increase their borrowing in order to defend a stable and fixed exchange rate with the 
dollar.10   
At the same historical conjuncture, the oil crisis began in 1973, which 
dramatically increased the cost of oil imports for non-oil producing nations.  Instead of 
                                                                                                                                                  
international trading environments as they pleased.  Hence, this decision was designed to create reliability 
and stability in international monetary relations between countries. See: Gowan 1999: 16, Hudson 2006: 22.    
8  For a comprehensive discussion on the privileges that accompanies seigniorage see: Gowan 1999: 25. 
9 If the Fed wanted to pursue a “strong dollar” policy, it could raise US interest rates, which would pull 
money out of circulation and into US Treasury Bonds.  Conversely, if the Fed wanted to depreciate the 
dollar it could do so by lowering interest rates (and hence the price at which banks purchase money from 
the Fed) allowing the banks to lend more liberally.  Increased liquidity would pressure the dollar to 
depreciate. 
 
10 If the value of a country’s currency is falling relative to the dollar, and the country wishes to defend its 
currency, it must have enough dollar reserve holdings to flood the FOREX, as to absorb the rising demand 
of the dollar.  The country then must take the value received from the sale of the dollar reserves and buy up 
its domestic currency, making the demand of the domestic currency rise.  Monetary crisis occurs when a 
country cannot stabilize its currency, because it has no more currency reserves to pump into the FOREX.  In 
the event that this occurs, the country must borrow the currency from either the IMF or from private banks 
if it is to maintain a steady exchange rate with the dollar.  According to Gowan, it is usually private banks 
that offer the most competitive rates for defending currencies, but as we will see this subjects borrowing 
countries to the volatility of short-term interest rates.  See Gowan 1999:33.   
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pursuing stabilization policies that would have required sharp macroeconomic 
adjustments, most nations decided to continue their industrialization efforts by expanding 
their external borrowing.  This, however, resulted in persistent inflationary trends across 
Latin America (Hoffman 2000).   The average rate of inflation steadily rose from 12 
percent in 1970, to over 60 percent by 1976 (ECLAC 1998: 356).  
Finally, the removal of the Bretton Woods international “capital controls”, 
allowed private Western banks (which ironically had also been selected to recycle 
OPEC’s petrodollars during the oil crisis) to emerge as the primary lenders to developing 
nations (Gowan 1999: 29). The dramatic increase in the price of oil due to the oil crisis 
ensured that there would be plenty of liquidity to go around.  Unlike the economic 
assistance that had come from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (the primary lending agents during the early postwar period), these private loans 
were offered at shorter terms and at interest rates that fluctuated with changes in US 
short-term rates.  In short, the “ US Federal Reserve could largely dictate the levels of 
international interest rates thorough moving US domestic interest rates…It could thus 
determine the cost of credit internationally with enormously powerful effects on other 
economies ” (Gowan 1999: 28).  Collectively, these factors brought an unprecedented 
amount of debt to developing nations. 
The Fed’s decision to strengthen the value of the dollar in the late 1970s by 
raising US interest rates set the stage for Latin America’s debt crisis. (Gowan 1999:40).  
For Latin America, the effects of this decision were three fold.  First, as mentioned above, 
a rising dollar meant that developing nations would have to borrow larger sums to defend  
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Table 2:Average Real Annual Percentage Interest Rate on Developing Country Floating-Rate 
Debt.11 
 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
-11.8 -7.4 -9.7 -6.0 14.6 16.7 15.9 
 
 
a stable and fixed exchange rate in order to continue the import of capital goods for the 
development of industry.  Second, the hike in US interest rates exponentially increased 
the indebtedness of developing countries, as interest rates on private loans spiked.   
As table 2 indicates, floating interest rates rose steadily on Latin American foreign debt 
from –11.8 in 1977 to 15.9 by 1983.12 Third, the rate hiked opened up investment 
opportunity in US bonds, which resulted in a massive wave of capital flight from Latin 
America to the North (Soederberg 2004: 37).   
A rising US dollar, coupled with the high cost of oil, made Latin American 
nations increasingly dependent on foreign finance.13  By the late 1970’s, the amount of 
debt that Latin American nations had accumulated reached crisis proportions.    Many 
nations were forced to continue borrowing just to meet debt service payments. In 1979 
Brazil directed 95.5% of its new finances to debt service payments (Evans 1983).     
As debt and inflation steadily rose, political pressures began to emerge against state-led 
development in some regions of Latin America.  Domestic enterprise became increasingly 
                                                 
11 Reisen (1985). 
12 Negative interest rates indeed seem paradoxical.  However, it is understandable when one considers the 
risk (from inflation) associated with holding on to massive amounts of capital.  Negative interest rates can 
best be understood as a fee that owners pay banks so that they may avoid the costs associated with holding 
to large sums of cash (Thornton 1999).  During the 1970s, the spike in oil prices produced a massive 
amount of revenue that OPEC states could not absorb into their own productive sectors.  Consequently, 
private US Banks were sought out as the ideal recycling agents, against their own will I might add.  
According to Gowan (1999: 22), the Nixon administration all but forced them to accept this role, as banks 
initially didn’t want the risk associated with investing such a huge amount of money.        
13 See: footnote 8. 
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aggravated by the high cost of domestic finance due to rate hikes that governments had 
implemented to curb inflation (Hoffman 2000:133).  As early as the mid 1970s, 
international and domestic capitalist classes had begun expressing their disapproval with 
the high levels of public ownership, price controls, and wage regulations (Soederberg 
2004:36).  Opposition was most pronounced in the Southern Cone, as exemplified by the 
region’s two US backed military coups, Chile in 1973 and Argentina in 1976.  Chile’s 
military government, in coordination with the US, was the first to implement neoliberal 
economic reform (Harvey 2007) in Latin America, and both regimes progressively shifted 
away from the ISI strategy towards an “outward oriented” model of development 
(Hoffman 2000:134). However, it wasn’t until after the eruption of the region wide debt 
crisis that neoliberalism became the standard model of development in the region.   
In the summer of 1982, both Brazil and Mexico found it impossible to keep up 
with debt service payments.  Their only option was to default on a combined debt of US$ 
300 billion.  The news of debt default terrified Western lenders.  The IMF, in 
collaboration with US Banks and the World Bank, set out on a purported “rescue 
operation” to help the countries “stabilize” their economies.  The plan they proposed 
included a rescheduling of debt payments and additional aid to stabilize the BoP deficit 
and to service the debt. However, the additional aid was contingent on the Mexican 
government taking steps to “stabilize” their economy by introducing austerity measures 
that required governments to impose strict monetary and fiscal discipline at the expense 
of the Mexican citizenry.  Austerity measures included: 
•  a cap on budget deficits; 
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•  a freeze on public spending levels; 
•  the removal of subsidies; 
• an increase in taxes; 
• currency devaluation.14  
 The implementation of austerity measures shifted national economies away from 
the ISI model of development toward an export-oriented model of growth.  Cheaper 
currency made exports more competitive while at the same time creating recession-like 
conditions that reduced demand for imports.  These measure were not designed to 
generate economic growth.  Rather, they were intended to induce savings, stabilize the 
balance of payments (BoPs), and generate hard currency from exports so that countries 
could service debt (Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1997:16). In this regard these policies 
were quite successful.  As table 3 indicates, from 1980-1989 economies in the region 
made dramatic cuts in imports and expanded exports, resulting in a trade surplus that 
began to rectify BoP problems. With savings generated from cuts in fiscal budgets and 
caps on imports, countries began making significant strides toward servicing their debt.  
However this success was not without its social cost. Cuts in fiscal expenditures led to 
sharp declines in public spending for social services, especially in the areas of healthcare 
and education (SAPRIN 2004).   
                   
 
 
                                                 
14 This list is based on SAPRIN 2004:176. 
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Table 3:External Balance, Latin America 1981-9 (billion $)15 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Goods Imports 93.53 100.90 82.19 60.31 61.80 61.13 61.92 69.78 78.97 84.81 
Goods Exports 91.41 98.59 89.49 89.94 100.20 94.28 79.35 90.13 102.45 111.57 
Trade Balance -2.12 -2.31 7.30 29.63 38.41 33.15 17.43 20.35 23.48 26.76 
Services Balance -29.37 -41.84 -50.28 -40.02 -41.67 -38.91 -36.57 -33.62 -36.74 -39.29 
Debt Service 26.97 29.89 32.31 30.01 31.11 31.65 31.98 32.04 37.85 34.16 
Current Account -30.18 -42.70 -41.89 -8.65 -0.99 -2.34 -16.02 -9.22 -8.69 -7.77 
 
 
The removal of subsidies and price controls contributed to a rise in the cost of living, 
unemployment, the displacement of domestic industry, and the degradation of 
infrastructure.  Together these factors put downward pressure on the living standards of 
popular sectors (Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1007:67). Initially these policies were met 
with resistance.  The increase in the price of food and fuel, along with the cessation of 
many imported consumer goods, sparked riots and protest in a number of countries.  The 
World Bank stepped in with additional funds that calmed the unrest.  These loans were 
contingent on nations instituting longer-term structural changes that had less of an 
immediate impact than did austerity measures (SAPRIN 2004). These reform packages 
became known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and were introduced with the 
intent of boosting investor confidence by creating a favorable investment climate for 
international capital.  (Hershberg and Rosen (2006:7).  These reforms benefited private 
banks in two important ways. First, the implementations of SAPs allowed private banks 
to recover some of their losses via the expropriation of public enterprises.  Second, it 
opened up investment opportunities that were less risky than traditional bank lending.  
                                                 
15 Inter American Development Bank 1990. 
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After the threat of debt default, many private lenders were less enthusiastic about having 
their assets tied up with the fates of borrowing countries.  IMF-led SAPs attempted to 
rectify this situation by insisting that nations remove controls on capital accounts as a 
condition for receiving additional aid.  This allowed private lenders to assume less risk.  
They could now lend to developing nations through the purchase of government 
securities, which could be withdrawn at the discretion of the lender (Gowan 1999: 41).  
As David  Harvey (2003: 62-67) has commented, the debt crisis established an 
unprecedented standard:  if “private lenders get over stretched in international lending”, 
“the IMF and the World Bank” will come “bail them out” by implementing greater 
control on debtor nations’ economies.     
It’s also important to consider why Latin American governments were obliged to 
accept the IMF’s terms of agreement, something that can only be appreciated after 
understanding the true significance of dollar seigniorage in international trade.  Since the 
dollar is the international medium of exchange, countries wishing to buy anything abroad 
must have dollars!  The two principle ways through which countries acquire dollars is 
through exports or loans.  Had governments refused these new terms and defaulted, their 
access to international currency would have all but dried up. Hence dollar seigniorage has 
endowed US financial institutions and the IMF, with the power to restructure the 
economies of developing nations to their own advantage by operating as the world’s 
principle source of credit (Gowan 1999: 21).  However as we will later see, Venezuela 
has emerged as a new international lender and threatens the regional supremacy of this 
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powerful creditors cartel. Although their specific application has varied by country, SAPs 
have most often included: 
•  trade liberalization; 
•  labor market reform 
•  deregulation of the financial sector/ open capital accounts;   
•  privatization of public enterprises and services.16   
 
The Demise of ISI and the Emergence of Neoliberalism in Venezuela 
Venezuela’s development history was quite different from most Latin American 
nations.  Due to its specificity, and because of its leading role in the creation of ALBA, it 
is necessary to distinguish Venezuela’s history from the general patterns that emerged 
during the development era. Because Venezuela had access to abundant oil revenues 
during the early twentieth century, it had less of an incentive to embark on major 
development projects during the early postwar period.  It wasn’t until 1959, after the price 
of oil began to fluctuate sporadically, that Venezuela implemented its ISI strategy.  
However, heavy oil revenues allowed Venezuela to finance its development model long 
after other nations in the region were forced to abandon ISI.       
Oil became the dominant feature of Venezuela’s economy after its discovery in 
the 1920s.  In the decades following, Venezuela would become one of the world’s largest 
oil producing countries.  By the 1930s, oil was the single most import source of private 
and public wealth, constituting 91.2 percent of total exports (Wilpert 2007: 10).  With an 
                                                 
16 This list is based on SAPRIN 2004:178. 
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abundance of oil revenues, Venezuela quickly evolved into a classic renter-state, using 
heavy oil rents to import consumer goods and finance ambitious social programs.  
However, beginning in the late 1950s, fluctuations in the international price of oil posed 
unprecedented challenges to Venezuela’s oil dependent economy.   In 1958, the 
reopening of the Suez Canal, coupled with the development of oil fields in the Middle 
East, drove oil prices down by 25 percent (Hoffman 2000:132).  The decline in oil 
revenue obliged the Venezuelan government to embark on an ISI strategy the following 
year. The goal was to create a robust agricultural and industrial base that would help 
diversify Venezuela’s economy away from oil (Naim 1993: 40).  Like other ISI strategies 
throughout Latin America, the state assumed heavy responsibility in the development 
process.  Tariffs were placed on imports that competed with domestic enterprise.  Oil 
revenues were used to import capital goods for the development of industry, mining, and 
agriculture (Naim 1993).  The Venezuelan state also relied on oil revenue for allocating 
heavy subsidies to these same sectors. To relieve inflationary pressures, the government 
implemented price controls on certain staple items such as corn, flour, milk sugar poultry, 
and sardines (Naim 1993: 55).    
Unfortunately, Venezuela’s efforts to develop industry and large-scale agricultural 
had little success.  Over reliance on state expenditures allowed firms to continue 
operation regardless of their competitiveness.  Moreover, the sell of oil maintained an 
overvalued Bolivar that undermined the competitiveness of Venezuela’s industrial base 
(both domestically and internationally).  Non-oil exports were too expensive to sale 
internationally, and consumer goods were cheaper to import than produce at home 
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(Wilpert 2007:11, Lebowitz 2006:86).  Nevertheless, Venezuela continued to pursue the 
ISI model up until the late 1980s.   
 Beginning in the 1970s, Venezuela began to experience the effects of sporadic 
international oil shocks, i.e., dramatic shifts in the price of oil.  The volatility of oil prices 
soon began to impact the state’s ability to manage its fiscal budget. When the price of oil 
increased, so did state spending for public expenditures and industrial projects.  However, 
when the price of oil dropped, the Venezuelan state did not adjust its spending levels.  
Rather the state relied on foreign banks to tide it over during periods of low oil prices.  As 
in the case of other nations who accepted private loans, the interest that Venezuela had to 
pay fluctuated with US short-term interest rates.  Likewise, when the US raised interest 
rates in 1979, not only did the interest on Venezuela’s private loans increase, but this also 
produced a massive wave of capital flight to the North, as investors sought better returns 
on their money capital.  By 1982 Venezuela foreign debt totaled over $35 billion (Naim 
1993).  As oil prices continued to drop throughout the 1980s, Venezuela found itself 
running massive trade and budget deficits.  By 1989, with its foreign reserves depleted, 
Venezuela was forced to borrow from international creditors once again.  However, this 
time additional loans were contingent upon Venezuela adopting both austerity measures 
and structural adjustment.  The implementation of austerity measures shifted Venezuela’s 
economy away from the ISI model of development toward an export-oriented model of 
growth.  As in other Latin American nations, the idea was to induce savings, stabilize the 
balance of payments (BoPs), and generate hard currency from exports so that Venezuela 
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could service its debt.  These efforts were complemented by structural adjustments that 
focused on creating a favorable investment climate for international capital.   
The austerity and structural adjustments that Venezuelan president Carlos Andres 
Perez agreed to were comprised of the same basic elements that other Latin American 
nations had adopted.  Austerity measures included: a cap on budget deficits; a freeze on 
public spending levels; the removal of subsidies; increased taxation; and free currency 
convertibility, which resulted in a 170 percent devaluation of the Bolivar (Naim 1993:54).  
Venezuela’s SAP included:  trade liberalization, privatization, financial and labor market 
reform.  The effects of trade liberalization and privatization measures will be highlighted 
along with other case examples in the following chapter.  However, because Venezuela’s 
financial reform was distinct in important ways from the regional patterns identified in the 
next chapter, it will not be included in the financial deregulation section in the next 
chapter.   
It is important, however, to briefly clarify the distinctiveness of Venezuela’s 
financial debacle. Unlike the experiences of most other Latin American nations that 
implemented structural adjustment, the financial reforms that were imposed actually 
brought tighter regulations back in; however, this was not before the financial sector 
collapsed.  Throughout the 1960 and 70s, there was little oversight and regulatory control 
over of banking practices.  Bankers were powerful lobbyists and had important political 
ties.  During the years of high oil prices Venezuelan banks enjoyed strong deposits and 
lent liberally.  A lack of government oversight lead to illegal accounting practices, bad 
loans, and corrupt clientele investments (Villasmil, Monaldi, Rios, and Gonzalez 2007: 
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277).  Although financial reforms (aimed at bringing in tighter regulatory controls) were a 
key feature of the 1989 structural adjustment, they did not advance as planned.  
Venezuela’s powerful banking cartel successfully postponed these measures up until a 
full-blown banking crisis emerged.  Ultimately, the government was forced to intervene 
in order to save four of the largest banks in Venezuela, but this came at the expense of the 
overall stability of the Venezuelan economy, as heavy government assistance left 
international reserves severely depleted.  Further declines in oil prices, the banking crisis, 
and resulting capital flight forced Venezuela to turn to international lending institutions.  
In order to restore investor confidence and secure international capital flows, Venezuela 
once again had to gain the IMF’s seal of approval.  This second round of structural 
adjustment was called “ The Agenda Venezuela Program”.  It was primarily designed to 
advance further the elements of the previous SAP, particularly the reestablishment of 
privatization and the effective implementation of financial regulation (Villasmil, Monaldi, 
Rios, and Gonzalez 2007). 
 At the present juncture, Venezuela is once again using heavy oil revenues to 
finance development. The failures of neoliberalism, which will be discussed in the 
following chapter, have relegitimated the state as the chief administrator responsible for 
directing national development.  What makes Venezuela’s current experience different 
form the ISI period, is that development is not be pursued strictly within the confines of 
its national borders.  Rather, Venezuela is using its windfall oil profits to pursue a 
regional development agenda known as ALBA.  Although the ALBA model faces some 
of the same challenges of ISI, I argue that its regional cooperative aspect gives it more 
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resources from which to pull from, allowing nations to pursue development collectively 
by “joining forces” as oppose to each country having to bear the burden alone.  But before 
expounding further upon ALBA, it is important to clarify the context in which this new 





Chapter 3  
Neoliberalism 
Eventually the adoption of SAPs became standard policy for any nation wishing to 
receive aid from the IMF, World Bank, and US lenders (SAPRIN 2004).  By the end of 
the 1980s, as the debt crisis came to full fruition, practically every nation in the region 
had implemented austerity measures and SAPs (Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1997: 16). 
Later, portions of these reform packages would be refined as some nations signed on to 
GATT (later to become the World Trade organization (WTO)), the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or various other 
bilateral agreements.   
Inspired by the guiding principles of classic libertarian philosophy and 
neoclassical economics, SAPs were designed to “free” markets and trade from control of 
the state.  The widespread implementation of SAPs and austerity measures marked the 
beginning of what is commonly referred to as the “neoliberal era”. Neoliberalism is a 
political and economic theory about how best to structure capitalist economies.17 The 
origins of neoliberalism can be traced back to the early libertarian philosophy of Herbert 
Spencer and to the work of early neoclassical economists such as Williams Stanley 
Jevons, Carl Menger, and Leon Walras.  Later, the famous Austrian School economist, 
Friedrich Alfred von Hayek would prove to be one of the most avid defenders of free 
markets and trade.  Hayek’s work would be very important to Milton Friedman and the 
“Chicago Boys”, the famous architects of early neoliberal policy in Chile 
                                                 
17 See: Fernandez-Kelly (2007) for a discussion on the lineage of neoliberal thought.  
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Neoliberalism holds that overall economic growth is best advanced through the 
free play of market forces (Hayek 1979).  According to this theory, free and open markets 
provide the most efficient means of allocating society’s productive resources. State 
intrusion into economic affairs should be strictly prohibited, so as to allow for market-
based solutions based on comparative advantage.  This premise holds that specializing in 
the production of goods and services in areas where there is greatest advantage best 
maximizes gains from international trade (Cole 1996: 233). Moreover, free and open 
economies usher in competition that facilitates such specialization by cleansing the 
economy of inefficient producers (Balassa, Bueno, and Simonsen 1986). With the influx 
of more efficiently produced imports, consumers benefit by having access to cheaper 
goods and services.  Furthermore, in terms of getting “prices right”, free markets provide 
the most efficient means for setting prices based on the law of supply and demand.  From 
this perspective consumers have the power to discipline producers by buying less when 
prices for goods and services rise to high. Conversely, the implementation of 
interventionist policies such as government price controls is apt to stifle reinvestment, 
leading to shortages in supply and setting up conditions for a thriving black market where 
prices rise to levels that exceed the purchasing power of most people.  Hence, the role of 
the state must be strictly relegated to establishing and protecting free markets, free trade, 
and private property rights (Harvey 2007:22).   
In practice, neoliberalism has often diverged from this theoretical model, 
especially with respect to the role of the state. Contrary to neoliberal orthodoxy, the 
emergence of neoliberal reform has not entailed the dismantling of state intervention in 
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the economy.  As will become clear, closer examination suggests that the state has moved 
to a more selective type of market intervention, one that rewards financial, transnational, 
and domestic capitalist classes at the expense of the popular sector (Reygadas 2006, 
Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1997).  Below, I draw attention to the effects of what I 
consider to the most significant aspects of neoliberal reform with respect to economic 
development, namely:   
•  trade liberalization  
•  privatization.    
•  financial sector liberalization 
 
For each of these, several national case examples are included although not fully 
developed.  They are intended to illustrate the occurrence of general patterns following 
the implementation of neoliberal reform and to set the stage for a better understanding of 
ALBA as an alternative in the following chapter.  
 
Trade Liberalization 
Trade liberalization came to full fruition after initial austerity measures had taken 
effect.  It is important to recall that austerity measures were aimed at generating savings 
in hard currency so that countries could begin servicing their debt.  The strategy was to 
curb imports and maximize exports.  Thus, following the implementation of austerity 
measures, tariffs had not been dissolved and quantitative restrictions on imports still 
applied (SAPRIN 2004:46). However, things started to change between the mid 80s and 
early 90s, as many countries began reducing or eliminating tariffs and quotas on imported 
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goods. The scenarios under which trade liberalization was advanced varied from country 
to country.  In many instances, trade liberalization was implemented in order to secure 
additional funds from the IMF. At other times it was adopted in connection with 
respective countries joining regional trading blocks such as the GATT, WTO, NAFTA, 
CAFTA, or other bilateral agreements.  Below I highlight the effects of trade 
liberalization with respect to Mexico, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.  I have 
different rationales for including these particular cases.   First, Mexico was chosen 
because of its involvement in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), one 
of the most controversial free trade agreements of the 1990s.  The cases of Venezuela and 
Nicaragua are important because both countries are members of ALBA. Exploring their 
history will put us in a better position to understand why these two countries have elected 
to pursue alternatives to free trade.  Similarly, I highlight Ecuador because of its close 
involvement in ALBA.  While not an official member, Ecuador has consistently sent a 
representative to the annual ALBA Summit and is actively pursuing complementary 
forms of integration with ALBA members.                
 In the case of Mexico, the government removed import restrictions on basic 
consumer goods as a means to tackle increasing inflation by channeling more supply into 
the domestic market (SAPRIN 2004:46).  At the same time, Mexico was attempting to 
expand its exports to the north but was increasingly met with US protectionism.  To get 
beyond this barrier, in 1987 Mexico agreed to the stipulations required by GATT, which 
promised greater access to US markets (Soederberg 2004: 41-43). Among these 
stipulations was a reduction in tariff levels from 50 percent to 20 percent of the total value 
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of the imported product (Jose Alberto Garibaldi 2007).18  The treaty negotiations led to 
additional complementarities between US capital and the transnational Maquila 
industries,19 with the US providing financial resources and Mexico providing cheap and 
“flexible” labor for the production of US imports (Jose Alberto Garibaldi 2007: 149).  As 
a result, Mexico’s export sector made modest gains.  This had a positive impact on 
unemployment levels and currency earnings in the more dynamic export regions 
(Reygadas 2006:125).  However, most of the jobs that were created were concentrated in 
the maquila industries, which provided unstable contract work and paid very low wages 
(Reygadas 2006: 126). 
 Unfortunately, the rest of the Mexican economy did not fare as well. The 
reduction of tariffs released a wave of cheap US imports that displaced most small and 
medium sized industry that produced for the domestic market (SAPRIN 2004, Reygadas 
2006, Veltmeyer and Petras 2000).  Also, the removal of government subsidies (as part of 
the austerity measures) certainly contributed to the decline of domestic production.  
Unfortunately, the high cost of credit inhibited most firms from making the technological 
renovations that would have allowed them to compete. 20   As numerous domestic firms 
closed down, unemployment soared and countless numbers were thrown into the ranks of 
the informal sector.21  In 1994 the situation was exacerbated with the signing of the 
                                                 
18 For a general discussion see: Jose Alberto Garibaldi 2007. 
19 For a general discussion on Maquila see: Soederberg 2004 44-45).   
20 The implementation of high interest rates was part of a two-fold strategy.  First, it would reduce the 
amount of money in circulation, which put downward pressure on inflation. Second, high interest rates were 
used to attract investment into government bonds which was a way for Mexico to provide its own source of 
financing after international credit had begun to dry up (more below).       
21 The “informal sector” is a term that denotes the major transformation that the labor reserve army has 
undergone since the rise of the neoliberal era.  Among those included in the informal sector are the 
unemployed and underemployed who are subject to irregular forms of employment- part time and short-
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NAFTA. The opening of trade resulted in a trade deficit that reached US$ 4.7 billion by 
2000.  By 1998, an estimated 20,000 small businesses had been forced into bankruptcy as 
a result of trade liberalization (SAPRIN 2004: 56).  The displacement of domestic 
producers has been accompanied by increasing numbers of transnational producers. As of 
2004, more than 70 percent of exporting enterprises were foreign owned (Reygadas 2007: 
SAPRIN 2004: 59).     
 The agriculture sector was hit the hardest, as domestic growers could not compete 
with the cheap imports that flowed in from the north.  These imports contributed to a 
significant rise in unemployment and the demise of domestic food production.22  Lower 
tariffs on subsidized23 US corn imports pushed the price of corn down to force more than 
1 million Mexican farmers out of business since 1994 (Prevost and Weber 2002: 71).  The 
dumping of cheap food imports, coupled with reductions in state support for domestic 
production, lead to declining food security in Mexico.  Food dependence rose from 18 
percent in 1980 to 43 percent by the end of the 1990s.  In 1996, over half of Mexico’s 
grain consumption was met through imports (SAPRIN 2004:142). Unfortunately, the 
increase in agricultural unemployment, along with the low wages associated with 
informal employment, has kept much of the popular sector from taking advantage of the 
cheap imports (Reygadas 2006).   
                                                                                                                                                  
term contract work.  It has been estimated that this sector makes up over 40 percent of the workforce in 
Mexico.  Also included in these ranks are a significant number of “officially” employed people.   The 
official unemployment record in Mexico is quite skewed, because it counts all those who work even one 
hour a week within the employed population.  For a general discussion on the informal sector see: 
Veltmeyer and Petras: 2000: 149.      
22 It is all but impossible to distinguish the specific effect of a single feature of macroeconomic policy.  In 
this case it is difficult to say exactly how much trade liberalization contributed to rising unemployment, as 
other policies were also implemented that contributed to overall unemployment e.g., privatization, financial 
deregulation.  
23 As of 2005, spending on agriculture subsidies totaled US$ 350 billion dollars (De la Barra 2007:52).  
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 Trade liberalization was first introduced in Ecuador beginning in 1986.  Initially 
this was a “touch and go” process, with only modest reductions in tariff rates and cuts on 
banned imports -from 600 to 200 percent (SAPRIN 2004: 46).  It wasn’t until the 
beginning of the 1990s that trade liberalization was accelerated.  By 1994, dramatic cuts 
in tariffs had been imposed, reducing the maximum level of protection from 75 percent to 
an average of 11 percent (SAPRIN 2004: 46).  Additional non-tariff reforms were also 
implemented to secure the county’s membership in the WTO even before negotiations 
began.  Among these were: the removal of import restrictions on agriculture products and 
machinery; and a 25 percent cut in port taxes.  By 1995, Ecuador was regarded as one of 
the most open trade regimes in Latin America.   
 As in Mexico, the increased openness of Ecuador’s domestic markets produced a 
trade imbalance, as imports grew at a faster rate than exports.  By 1990 trade imports 
were growing at an annul rate of 15 percent, while exports grew only by 5.6 percent 
(SAPRIN: 2004).  The growing trade deficit led to a decline in terms of trade, resulting in 
a decline of the value of exports SAPRIN 2004: 49.  For example, the share of GDP 
attributed to exports rose from 21.5 percent in 1980 to 25.8 percent in 1990.  However, 
the total value of exports declined from US$ 2.52 billion to US$ 2.35 billion during the 
same period (SAPRIN 2004: 49).  Again, the arrival of cheap imports coincided with the 
displacement of domestic manufacturing.  The total share of industrial firms registered in 
the economy dropped from 20.4 percent in 1985 to 11.6 percent in 1988.  During the 
same period, the percentage of total sales attributed to manufacturing fell from 40.4 
percent to 31.4 percent (SAPRIN 2004: 58).  The demise of the manufacturing sector 
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contributed to higher unemployment rates, which rose from 6.1 percent in 1990 to 10.4 
percent by 1996 (ECLAC 1998:198).  The poorest sectors of the population have been 
affected the most.  The bottom 25 percent of the population experienced a rise in 
unemployment from 10 percent in 1989 to 24 percent by 1999.  Moreover, the Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.44 in 1988 to 0.57 in 2000 (SAPRIN 2004:64). 
 In Nicaragua, similar patterns played out, except that in this case neoliberalism 
was ushered in after a US economic embargo and low intensity warfare of the US-backed 
Contras broke the back and legitimacy of Sandinism in 1990 (Vanden 2002).  Following 
the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, the Chamorro administration, under the advice and 
financial support of the IMF and the World Bank, enthusiastically introduced neoliberal 
reform.  Trade liberalization was constituted through the removal of import restrictions 
and a reduction in the average tariff level, from 42 percent in 1990 to 15 percent by 1992 
(Vanden 2002).  As with our previous two examples, trade liberalization opened 
Nicaragua up to a wave of imports that grew faster than the country’s exports (ECLAC 
1998:256).  As the trade balance ballooned, Nicaragua began to experience a decline in 
the terms of trade.  The total value of exports fell US$ 87 million from 1990 to 1992, 
while the value of total value of imports climbed by US$ 237 million (Vanden 2002: 
165).  This produced a BoP deficit that reached US$642 million by 1997 (ECLAC 
1998:256).  By the mid 1990s external debt had climbed to US$ 12 billion dollars, 
making Nicaragua one of the most heavily indebted countries per capita in the world 
(Vanden 2002: 165).  To service the debt, the government spent over 60 percent of the 
value of its exports (Vanden 2002: 166).  In order to rectify the situation, the government 
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increased credit to large scale farming to stimulate exports but reduced credit to small and 
medium sized farming operations.  The new lines of finance to large agribusiness had 
little effect on the trade deficit, as the total value of imports continued to outpace the total 
value exports.  However, the reduction in credit to small and medium sized farming 
resulted in the demise of small and medium scale agriculture.  This was followed by 
dramatic increase in employment.  The little job growth that existed was concentrated in 
the informal sector. By the mid 1990s the official unemployment rate reached 21.8 
percent (ECLAC 1998:256).  By most accounts unemployment was much higher.  In 
1995, even the American Embassy estimated that over 60 percent of the able bodied 
population was either unemployed or underemployed (Vanden 2002: 166). 
 Venezuela became one of the most liberalized trade regimes in Latin America 
following the implementation of trade liberalization in 1989.  Protectionist strategies that 
were implemented during ISI were dissolved. Subsidies for domestic production was 
suspended, and average tariff levels were reduced from 35 percent in 1988 to 10 percent 
by 1990, making them among the lowest in the region. The explanation for these reforms 
was the same as those that had been used by other heads of state that agreed to austerity 
and structural adjustment: the need to rectify disequilibrium in the economy i.e., stabilize 
balance of payments by orienting the economy toward export, so as to bring more revenue 
into the country than was being spent abroad.  Unfortunately, these polices were not as 
successful as initially hoped.  The growth of non-oil exports following the reforms was 
negligible.  Perhaps more disturbing was that these policies lead to a lack of investment 
opportunity for domestic capitalists, which in many instances produced capital flight.  
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Finally, the dramatic rise in the price of consumer goods that accompanied these reforms 
lead to deteriorating societal conditions and social unrest.       
Let us recall that ISI did not create a robust industrial base in Venezuela as it did 
in other Latin American nations.  Because the export of oil undermined the 
competiveness of industry, domestic enterprise was largely comprised of retailers that 
imported cheap consumer goods with overvalued currency.  The manufacturers that did 
exist were largely inefficient by international standards.  Decades of heavy government 
subsidies allowed these firms to operate without making significant reinvestments into 
production. The impacts of trade liberalization, coupled with the devaluation of the 
Bolivar and the removal of government subsidies (two central components of the austerity 
program), put domestic enterprises in uncharted territory.  No longer could retailers 
depend on a strong Bolivar to import and sale consumer goods at competitive prices.  
Moreover, domestic manufacturers found it difficult to compete with imports once tariffs 
were removed, as this required significant investments into an industrial base that had 
long been outdated.  Likewise, the expectation that a devalued currency would allow 
Venezuela’s small and highly inefficient industries to compete in international markets 
was unrealistic.   
Instead of producing a robust export economy, these trade reforms actually 
encouraged capital flight, as Venezuela’s domestic producers were obliged to deinvest 
their capital and look for investment opportunities abroad. The chairman of an important 
business organization explained the scenario that confronted Venezuelan industries 
following trade reform.           
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Since our beginning, in the early sixties, the government had always protected and 
offered us all sorts of special incentives.  It’s true that it also controlled our prices 
and made life difficult in many other ways, but on balance it created conditions for 
us and others to grow and prosper.  We never had to worry a whole lot about 
foreign competition and the exchange rate made it impossible for us to even 
attempt to export.  Since we began, [non-oil] exports had never been a government 
priority…Now, all of a sudden the government tells us that protection against 
cheaper foreign products will be taken away from us and that we will have to 
compete internationally and start exporting.  In order to do that I will have to do 
two things: Bring back several million dollars, buy new machines and modernize 
our operation, making it more efficient, and the other is to buy myself and my 
people new suitcases and start traveling around the world trying to sell my 
products in competition with the Taiwanese and the Koreans, who, by the way, 
have been doing it for decades before us.  On top of this, of course, I will be 
risking the possibility that a new government, or a new team in this same 
government, will change the policies and let the exchange rate appreciate and 
wipe out any competitive gains that we may have achieved.  At the same time, our 
holdings abroad not only are safe and without risks in comparison to our local 
operations, but  each year they generate more profits than we can ever dream of 
making here, and this without having to worry about the government, the unions, 
or the Taiwanese (Naim 1993: 79). 
 
Venezuelan firms that actually pursued export strategies were increasingly confronted 
with protectionism from the North.  In 1993, it was estimated that Venezuelan firms lost 
over $400 million per year in potential earnings due to US protectionism (Naim 1993).   
On the whole, trade liberalization, coupled with the removal of government 
subsidies, has undermined the development of Venezuela’s industrial sector.  Cheap 
foreign imports has kept local producers from establishing a foothold in domestic 
markets, while protectionism, a lack of exporting experience, and less efficient industry, 
have thwarted growth in non-oil exports. Coupled with this is the fact that Venezuelan 
retailers, traditionally the most durable sector, declined significantly after the devaluation 
of the Bolivar (Naim 1993).  Following the implementation of trade reform, Venezuela 
experienced a nearly 10 percent drop in output.  Total GDP fell by 8.6 percent and non-oil 
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GDP contracted 9.8 percent by the end of 1989 (Naim1993: 56).  Unemployment rose 3.5 
percent, up from about 7 percent in 1988 to 10.4 percent by 1992 (ECLAC 1998: 312).  
On top of this, disposable income shrank by 14 percent and real salaries declined by 11 
percent by 1989. (Naim 1993:57).    
  Despite this largely negative summary of trade liberalization, various gains were 
made by Latin American economies. Over time, most Latin American nations 
increasingly gained better access to US markets and hence, accomplished modest gains in 
exports.  However, this was most always accompanied by excessive rates of imports, 
which had a detrimental effect on both domestic production and the balance of payments.  
Moreover, most of the benefits of trade liberalization were reaped by large-scale 
producers- many of which were transnationals.  One problem that continued to haunt 
most nations during the decade was a lack of export diversity.  Many countries remained 
depended on just a few exports with very little value added - mainly agriculture products 
and natural resources (ECLAC1998).  
 Despite the largely negative impact that trade liberalization has had on weaker less 
developed countries, Latin American nations have been developing their own free trade 
blocks – MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and CAN (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru).  This has coincided with US efforts to establish the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) which would encompass all of South and Central America.  
However, negotiations broke down in 2004, after the countries of MERCOSUR insisted 
that the US reduce subsidies (Dierckxsens 2007: 307). As of yet, neither side has backed 
down. Meanwhile, public criticism has been mounting that CAN and MERCOSUR have 
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the same inherent weaknesses that have accompanied the liberalized trade agreements of 
the past (Dello Buono and Bell Lara 2007).  In practice these agreements are based solely 
on commercial interest.  In the case of MERCOSUR, de la Barra (2007:75) has noted, “ 
small countries like Uruguay and Paraguay are becoming powerless in relation to Brazil 
and Argentina, their comparatively gigantic partners.”  Also, bitter disputes between 
Argentina and Brazil involving allegations of food dumping and tariff regulations have 
undermined efforts to build a cooperative and mutually beneficial model integration.24  
Similar patterns have played out in CAN, with Venezuela ultimately abandoning the 
group after arguments broke out about its refusal to abandon research and development of 
generic medications for its peoples (de la Barra 2007: 74-75). 
 
Privatization 
As already mentioned, one of the main propositions of neoliberal orthodoxy is that 
the production of all goods and services should be opened to the “free market”.  As part 
of the plan to free up markets from control of the state, governments have become active 
in selling off public assets to the private sector.  The privatization of natural resources, 
state-owned enterprises, and public services is the second primary feature of the 
neoliberal project. Justifications for privatization have emphasized the need to increase 
economic efficiency, improve the quality of goods and services, attract foreign 
investment, and relieve ballooning fiscal budgets from inefficient and costly units of 
                                                 
24 For more on Argentina and Brazil’s disputes over tariff regulations and food dumping see Vigevani, 
Pasquariello, Fernandes, and Campus 2002: 239.   
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production.  Moreover, proponents argue that privatization will reduce government 
corruption and increase total employment in the economy (SAPRIN 2004:112).  
In practice, however, privatization has met few of these expectations.  On the 
contrary, acquisitions of most public enterprises have not taken place under competitive 
and transparent conditions but rather, through clientele linkages between state and local 
elite.  Furthermore, the claim that privatization is necessary to increase efficiency and 
relieve the state from the burden of maintaining unproductive industries is hollow since in 
most cases it has proven easier to privatize the more efficient public enterprises. The main 
aim of privatization schemes, according to Harvey (2003), has been to open up new 
domains for capital accumulation in areas that were formerly off limits to the profit 
motive. As a result, privatization has increased unemployment, restricted access to life 
sustaining resources, and cut state revenue that could be used to fund social programs or 
finance the development of strategic sectors.  Below I highlight the effects of 
privatization in Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela.  Argentina is included in the case 
examples because it had one of the most ambitious privatization programs in Latin 
America during the 1990s.  In addition to being cases where privatization was highly 
contested, Venezuela and Bolivia are used because both are ALBA members.  Exploring 
their histories will shed light on why both countries have abandoned neoliberalism and 
pursued alternative paths to development. 
During the same period in Argentina, Carlos Menem’s administration embarked 
on one of the most aggressive privatization programs in the region, including: the 
privatization of gas, electricity, water, sewage, steel, petroleum, telecommunications and 
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airlines.  These resources were purchased at very low prices by some of the largest 
conglomerates in Argentina.  Reportedly the state airline, Aerolineas Argentina, was 
purchased at a price that was equal to the cost of two of its Boeing jets, while the state 
telephone monopoly, Entel, was purchased for less than a third of its estimated value 
(Veltmeyer, Petras, and Vieux 1997: 77).  These purchases took place between pacts of 
high-ranking government officials and powerful businesses. Afterwards, many of the 
officials involved, went on to take high paying jobs in the newly privatized firms 
(Reygadas (2006:133).   
Following the privatization of basic utilities, the public experienced substantial 
rate increases, accompanied by less than adequate service with respect to water and 
electricity. Some companies cut off services altogether to the poorest, and hence less 
profitable, areas (Dierckxsens 2007: 314).  Moreover, the unemployment rate increased 
substantially due to lay-offs.  Between 1990 and 1995 it is estimated that over 25 percent 
of the overall rise in employment is attributable to privatizations (Acuna, Galiani, and 
Tommasi 2007: 57-58). 
In Bolivia, beginning in the mid 1990s, Sanchez de Lozado’s administration 
oversaw the privatization of the nation’s oil, gas, telecommunications, airlines, electricity 
and railroads. 25  Together these industries accounted for about 60 percent of government 
revenues. The government justified the sell off by arguing that it would create 500,000 
new jobs, and raise the annual GDP growth by 6 percent.  Following privatization, the 
telecommunications, oil, gas, and railroad industries all increased in efficiency and 
productivity, due to increases in investment and technological renovation. Within months 
                                                 
25 Case material for Bolivia is summarized from Kohl 2002:456-461. 
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most of these industries began generating sizable gains.  By 1999, the Cruz Blanca 
railroad line had doubled its annual profits.  However, the high profit rates of these 
companies did little to benefit the general public.  In 1998 the government substantially 
reduced taxes and royalties on oil and natural gas, relinquishing an estimated US$ 4 
billion in public funds over 20 years.  Also, contrary to de Lozado’s prediction, the 
privatized firms cut more jobs than they created.  The fact that Cruz Blanca cut over 4100 
jobs no doubt contributed to its increase in profits.  Likewise, the national oil company 
Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales Boliviano (YPFB) reduced its work force by 3000.  
Unfortunately, many of the workers who lost their jobs have been unable to find 
comparable employment opportunities in the private sector.  Of the 4100 workers who 
lost their jobs at Cruz Blanca, only 25 percent were reported to have found skilled jobs. 
Another 25 percent were forced into immigration, while the remaining 50 percent were 
thrown into the informal sector.  Aside from the loss of public jobs, privatization has also 
had other negative impacts on the Bolivian citizenry.  Since 1997, rate hikes on gas, 
electricity gasoline, and diesel fuel have lead to a string of popular protests.   
A tipping point was when the government sold off the Cochabamba public water 
company in 2000.  The privatization of the Cochabamba water company sparked an 
uprising after rates increased over 100 percent.  Following three months of riots that left 5 
dead and 42 wounded, the government finally agreed to return the water company to the 
public. As the above examples have demonstrated, this form of economic restructuring 
has permitted the private sector to strip the public of basic life necessities (not only in 
terms of goods and services but also the streams of revenue that they generate), 
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contributed substantially to unemployment26 and fostered corrupt linkages between the 
state and the private sector.   
Privatization was a central component of both waves of Venezuela’s structural 
adjustment, first in 1989 and later in 1996.  By 1991, four commercial banks, the national 
airline, the state television network, the state phone company, water, several ports, the 
national sugar mills, several hotels and horse racing tracks had all been privatized.  The 
justification for such an ambitious privatization program was similar to that of other 
countries who implemented such reforms: the need to cap budget deficits and freeze 
public spending levels. (Naim 1993, Villasmil, Monaldi, Rios, and Gonzalez 2007).  But 
as even the World Bank admitted, the sale of CANTV (the state telephone company) 
could hardly be justified, as it had did not constitute a fiscal burden - it actually had a 
positive cash flow (Villasmil, Monaldi, Rios, and Gonzalez 2007 .  By 1995, four years 
after its privatization, CANTV had cut nearly 30 percent of its workforce (Villasmil, 
Monaldi, Rios, and Gonzalez 2007).  In 1997, Sidor, Venezuela’s largest aluminum and 
steel industry was privatized.  Soon thereafter the industry reduced its workforce by 44 
percent.  Of the 14,500 workers that the company employed, 10,000 were converted into 
the ranks of the informal sector, without benefits and pensions (Estes 2005).  It is not 
clear exactly how much the other privatizations mentioned above contributed to 
unemployment and underemployment, but it would be safe to assume that they were not 
insignificant.  By 1996 Venezuela’s unemployment rate hovered around 12 percent, while 
over 50 percent of the workforce was comprised of informal workers (ECLAC 1998: 
                                                 
26 Since the 1980’s public employment has steadily declined due to both privatizations and eroding state 
expenditures. In 1990, alone, public employment fell in Latin America from 41.7 percent to 40.6 percent 
(Reygadas 2006: 135). 
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312,317).  One of the most controversial privatizations was the opening up of 
Venezuela’s oil reserves to transnational oil companies.  The measure overturned 
Venezuela’s 1975 nationalization of the oil industry, allowing foreign companies to pay 
only 1 percent in royalties of the total value of oil extracted from the ground (Embassy of 
Venezuela 2008). 
 
Financial Sector Deregulation 
The path to financial deregulation was paved beginning in the 1973 when the 
Nixon administration removed the Bretton Woods regulations on international financial 
movements.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the abolition of ‘capital controls’ was 
instrumental in establishing the US financial system as the world’s main provider of 
credit (Gowan 1999:25).  This development led to the indebtedness of many Latin 
American nations beginning in the mid 1970s, as international credit was now linked to 
US short-term interest rates.  After the emergence of the 1980s debt crisis, however, many 
private lenders were less enthusiastic about having their assets tied up with the fates of 
borrowing countries.  IMF-imposed SAPs attempted to rectify this situation by insisting 
that nations remove controls on capital accounts as a condition for receiving additional 
aid.  This made for a less risky investment on the part of private lenders who could now 
lend to developing nations through the purchase of government securities that could be 
withdrawn at the discretion of the lender (Gowan 1999: 41).  Likewise, increased 
investment into government bonds provided healthy support to nations’ currencies and 
governments could take the money from the sale to finance their operations.   Despite the 
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insistence of the IMF, most nations refused to open capital accounts initially.  Below I 
highlight the effects of financial deregulation in Mexico Argentina, and Brazil.  As we 
will see, the removal of capital controls in these countries resulted in the three largest 
financial collapses in Latin America.  
With respect to Mexico, it wasn’t until 1990 that it fully liberalized its capital 
account. This decision had disastrous consequences on the internal stability of the 
Mexican economy and subsequently, other countries in the region.  The signing of the 
NAFTA accord in 1993 unleashed a flood of US imports into Mexico.  A trade imbalance 
ensued that pushed Mexico’s BoP into the negative (ECLAC 1998: 244). Mexico needed 
additional finance to defend its currency and service its debt obligations.  Unlike previous 
times, however, international lending institutions did not come to the rescue.  Mexico was 
forced to supply its own finance through the sale of government bonds yielding high rates 
of interest. To attract foreign investment Mexico pegged the peso to the dollar by 
shedding its dollar holdings for pesos in the FOREX.27  This move reassured investors 
that the value of their bonds would not be subject to sporadic devaluations due to a 
volatile Mexican economy).  Next, the government hiked interest rates up to as high as 19 
percent (much higher then the money centers located in the North) to attract a wave of US 
investment (Soederberg 2004: 49).  Following the rate hike, a massive wave of 
investment poured in.  The influx of capital into the country resulted in a significant 
appreciation of the peso.28  This made Mexico’s exports less competitive in international 
                                                 
27 Governments manipulate the supply and demand of currencies in this way to raise, lower, or stabilize the 
exchange rates of their currency.  See footnote 7 in chapter 1. 
28 An increase in foreign investment will have the same effect on a country’s currency as an increase in 
exports.  In both cases there will be an increase in foreign demand for the domestic currency, since goods, 
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markets, while simultaneously producing an import boom. The trade deficit quickly 
pushed Mexico’s BoP further into the negative.  Fearful that this imbalance would 
provoke the Mexican government to devalue the peso, and hence their investments, 
speculators began pulling out in November of 1994.  This marked the beginning of the 
Mexico’s financial crisis.  The Mexican government attempted to reassure investors by a 
last ditch effort to defend the pegged exchange rate by pumping US$4.5 billion into the 
FOREX in December (Bello, Malhotra, Bullard, and Mezzera 2000: 12).  Finally, in late 
December government could no longer maintain the overvalued exchange rate.  Before 
letting the peso devalue, the Mexican government helped the reaming bondholders get 
their money out while the middleclass lost their life savings (Reygadas 2006: 129, 
Soederberg 2004: 50).  After bondholders pulled the plug, Mexico experienced its worst 
depression on record, interest rates skyrocketed, the productive sector collapsed, and 
unemployment and poverty rates rose sharply rose sharply (Reygadas 2006: 129, 
Soederberg 2004: 51).  To those who hold that financial liberalization is part of an overall 
strategy dismantle state intervention in the economy, it is important to note that the “free 
market” did not induce the initial wave of investment into government securities.  Rather, 
the state was actively involved in manipulating exchange rates and interest rates with the 
objective of producing an “investor friendly” environment. 
Argentina experienced a similar crisis after liberalizing its capital account 
(Frenkel 2007, Reygadas 2006).  In 1991, Argentina instituted a policy of free capital 
mobility with an open capital account, as part of an overall strategy to lower inflation 
                                                                                                                                                  
services, property assets, and financial assets can only be purchased with the respective country’s currency.  
For a comprehensive discussion on currency valuation, see: Hahnel 2002: 198-207.   
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(Acuna, Galiani, and Tommasi 2007: 43).   As with Mexico, foreign investors were 
attracted by the sale of government bonds yielding high rates of interest and a peso – 
dollar convertibility scheme.  What was even more appealing about Argentina’s 
investment climate was that the government backed the value of every security sold with 
US dollars. Under Argentine law, the central bank could issue no more bonds than 
exceeded the total value of its US dollar reserves (Frenkel 2007)). This gave investors the 
liberty to immediately convert their profit holdings into dollars, as oppose to having to 
cash them in for dollars in the FOREX.   The influx investment significantly appreciated 
the peso.  The appreciation of the peso’s exchange rate made Argentina’s exports less 
completive, ultimately resulting in the collapse of the manufacturing sector (Vilas 
2007:120, Reygadas 2006: 130).   Following the demise of the manufacturing sector, peso 
to dollar conversions soon began to outpace the country’s currency reserve holdings.  The 
only other major source of revenue was provided by the government’s heavy-handed 
privatization policy.  What made the situation particularly burdensome was the frequency 
in which Argentine profits were being cashed in for dollars, as speculators sought to 
minimize their risk.  After the privatization process had been exhausted, Argentina 
depended solely on foreign lending (short-term loans with high interest) to provide the 
steady inflows of revenue needed to fuel the convertibility scheme (Vilas: 2007:121). 
With the immense growth in Argentinean debt, investors increasingly lost confidence in 
the government’s ability to maintain the peso dollar convertibility.  Soon a panic ensued 
and speculators, with the help of the government, cashed in their remaining investments 
and repatriated the holdings, while the popular sectors lost their life savings (Reygadas 
 
46
2006:130).  In October of 2001, Argentina’s economy collapsed.  The economic crisis 
was particularly hard on the popular classes. The official unemployment soared near 20 
percent (Acuna, Galiani, and Tommasi 2007: 58).  Instead of providing assistance to the 
unemployed, as the catastrophe unfolded, public spending was directed toward paying the 
interest on the debt that financed the peso – dollar convertibility scheme.  In the end, 60 
percent of the population was left below the poverty line (Gonzalez, 2003, Acuna, 
Galiani, and Tommasi 2007: 59). 
Similar patterns played out in Brazil, where the government spent $50 billion to 
maintain an exchange rate in order to attract the necessary investment into government 
bonds.  Of course once the bubble burst, most of the money ended up in the pockets of 
foreign speculators.  According to Reygadas (2006:130), “some [speculators] lost and 
others came out ahead, but overall they [speculators] gained an amount roughly 
equivalent to what the government lost.”         
 
Summary 
High capital mobility, coupled with open capital accounts, has made for an 
extremely volatile economic climate and has not been conducive to attracting long-term 
investments in production.  As Rene Villarreal (1990: 297) has commented, financial 
liberalization, “… leads to the progressive deterioration of the productive sector…because 
the profitability and maturation of productive investments cannot match those in the 
speculative sector.”     Since the beginning of the 1990s, net capital flows into the region 
have increased dramatically, rising from US$ 7 billion in 1991to US$ 32 billion by 1993 
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(Bello, Malhotra, Bullard, and Mezzera 2000: 8.)  The vast majority of this capital has not 
been invested in production but used for extracting rents on government securities (Bello, 
Malhotra, Bullard, and Mezzera 2000: 8.). The erratic and speculative nature of finance 
capital, as demonstrated in the case of Mexico and Argentina, has proven detrimental to 
the overall stability of the internal economy.  Foreign speculators have looted some of the 
largest economies in the region, taking with them the savings of the middle and working 
classes. Moreover, the strategies that governments employ to attract this predatory 
investment, such as maintaining high interest rates and overvaluing the domestic 
currency, restricts financial resources for domestic production, and weakens the 
productive sector’s competitiveness in the international economy (Villarreal 1990: 297, 
SAPRIN 2004: 76).   
Coupled with this, has been the pervasiveness of liberalized trade and 
privatization.  The opening of the domestic market to foreign subsidized imports, 
combined with the elimination of tariffs and other protectionist measures, has taken its 
toll on the domestic economy.  Countless small and medium scale industries have been 
displaced.  Agriculture production has taken the hardest hit, which has resulted in the 
destruction of the domestic food base in many regions.    Moreover, privatization schemes 
have striped the poor of basic life necessities and cut the streams of state revenue that 
once financed the development of strategic sectors and subsidized the disadvantaged 
sectors of the population.  With the loss of public employment, millions of workers have 
been thrown into the ranks of the informal sector or forced into immigration.  Collectively 
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these policies have resulted in increasing inequality, unemployment, and widespread 
poverty (Bell Lara and Lopez 2007: 22-27). 
 
Inequality, Unemployment, and Poverty 
The 1990 World Bank Development Report indicated that in Latin America the 
difference between the richest 20 percent and the poorest 20 percent was 19-to- one 
(World Bank, 1990).  According to a 2000 IDB report, the wealthiest 10 percent of the 
Latin American population was receiving 40 percent of the total income (IDB 2000).    
With respect to unemployment, between 1990 to 2000 the total number of idle workers 
expanded by 10 percent per year, with overall unemployment rising over 3 percent during 
the same period (Bell Lara and Lopez 2007).  From 1990 to 2006, public employment 
dropped from 42 percent to 40.6 percent (Reygadas 2006:135).  With the loss of public 
jobs, workers have had to look for employment opportunities in the private sector which 
is increasingly offering only part-time and short-term contract employment.  Between 
1990 and 1999, it is estimated that 20 million of the total 29million new jobs created 
provided informal employment (Reygadas 2006:136).  The rise in unemployment and 
underemployment has resulted in an increase in official poverty rates.  From 1970 -1979 
the average poverty rate had fallen an estimated 40 percent (Bell Lara and Lopez 
2006:26).  However, since the beginning of the neoliberal period, poverty rates have 
started to climb again.  By 1990 the average poverty rate reached 48.3 percent (ECLAC 
2001).  Between 1990-1999 an additional 11 million people had been thrown into the 
ranks of the poor, bringing the total number of persons living in poverty to 211 million 
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(ECLAC 2001).  In 2006, the Economic Commission for Latin American and the 
Caribbean estimated that half of Latin America’s poor live on less than a dollar a day 
(ECLAC 2006).          
 
Dismal Economic Growth 
 Since the implementation of the neoliberal model, the overall growth rate for the 
region has been dismal, leading many to aptly term the period from 1980 to 1990 as the 
“lost decade”.   During this period, the average annual growth rate for Latin America and 
the Caribbean was little more than 1 percent  (ECLAC 1998: 358).  From 1980 to 2000 
per capita income (the most basic measure of economic progress) has grown by only 9 
percent.  Compare this to the 82 percent rise in per capita income between 1960-1980 
(Weisbrot 2006:3).  The net transfer of resources abroad (to service debts) has been one 
of the main factors contributing to the region’s poor economic growth (ECLAC1998: 
359).  Debt servicing has absorbed most of the revenue that could be redirected back into 
production.  Consequently, average total investment amounted to only 17 percent of the 
regional product, a 50-year low (ECLAC1998: 361).   Despite the poor growth record 
and the deteriorating quality of life that has accompanied the neoliberal model, it has 
proven resilient and continues to consolidate itself within the political and economic 
fabric of Latin America (Dello Buono and Bell Lara 2007).  This is most exemplified by 
the neoliberal inspired agreements signed between Latin American Nations e.g., 
MERCOSUR and CAN.  Portions of these agreements contain elements that have been 
responsible for much of the devastation of the last 40 years.  As mentioned above, the 
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core principles in these agreements are by and large commercial and based on the tenets 
of liberalized trade (de la Barra 2007:75).  Moreover, these agreements are fostering 
divisions between nations, as each country wrestles for greater position over the other.  
It would be an error, however, to presume that the resiliency of this hegemonic 
doctrine has gone uncontested.  On the contrary, the deteriorating quality of life that has 
accompanied the neoliberal model has harvested waves of resistance that have spread (in 
varying degrees) across all of Latin America. The anti-neoliberal current has opened up 
new spaces for discussion and debate about alternative development strategies in the 
region. Dello Buono and Bell Lara (2007:73) point out that there is an increasing urgency 
to define a regional development agenda that responds to the demands and interests of the 





Chapter 4  
ALBA and the Call for a More Egalitarian Form of Integration 
 Recently, Cuba and Venezuela have proposed the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin 
America (ALBA) as an alternative model of development for the region.  ALBA, named 
after Simon Bolivar, the 19th century revolutionary that liberated South America from 
Spanish rule, is a Latin American and Caribbean trading block comprised of 
unconventional inter-state programs, trade agreements, and joint ventures that are 
purportedly directed toward cooperative and mutually beneficial forms of economic 
integration. As a model of development, its purported aim is to rectify the ills that 
neoliberalism has generated. According to its architects, ALBA constitutes a radical break 
with neoliberal-led integration in that it advocates a different type of development that is 
not strictly based on profit maximization at the expense of weaker less developed nations 
(ALBA2008). Their proposals and declarations characterize ALBA as a regional 
integration project that is based on egalitarian principles and directed toward fostering 
sustainable economic and human development for all its peoples (ALBA 2004).    
ALBA was first proposed by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez at Isla Margarita 
at the III Summit of the Heads of State in December 2001.  It would be three years later, 
however, before the first official declaration of ALBA was signed between Venezuela and 
Cuba in Havana on Dec. 14 2004.  Bolivia signed on in April 2006, and Nicaragua signed 
on immediately after the election of Daniel Ortega in January 2007.  Dominica made its 
membership official in January of 2008 at the Sixth ALBA Summit; and Honduras, the 
most recent ALBA member, joined in August.  
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Other countries have signed on to specific ALBA projects but, interestingly, have 
not made their membership official. Ecuador and the countries that make up Petrocaribe, 
the ALBA energy integration project for Cuba, Nicaragua, and other members of the 
Caribbean are the most prominent examples.  According to Medea Benjamin (2008), the 
presidents of these nations would like to make their membership official but face internal 
pressure not to align too closely with such controversial figures as Chavez, Morales, 
Ortega, and Castro, a group that regularly refers to itself as the Club of “Chicos Malos”, 
or bad boys.  Despite such internal opposition, Ecuador has consistently sent 
representatives to the annual ALBA Summit, as have the multiple nations that make up 
Petrocaribe (more on Petrocaribe below).   
The formal organizational structure of ALBA was established in April 2007 at the 
Fifth ALBA Summit.  The governing structure is comprised of representatives from all 
official member countries. It includes a council of presidents, ministers, and social 
movements.  The council on social movements was implemented as a means to 
incorporate grassroots participation in the decision-making process.  It includes 
representatives from Honduras, Peru, El Salvador, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia .  The 
incorporation of social movements into the governing architecture exemplifies what 
Ximena de la Barra (2007:75) has said about ALBA, namely that  “integration ceases to 
be a matter for governments who may be more or less submissive to imperial interest and 
becomes transformed into a matter of the people.” 
Below I explore the contours of ALBA as an alternative model of development.  I 
provide an overview of the theoretical orientation of ALBA including the “guiding 
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principles” stated in the official declaration that directs the integration process.  Later, I 
expound upon some of the concrete projects that have been implemented to date.  I will 
follow up with an assessment about ALBA’s overall potential as an alternative to 
neoliberalism, paying special attention to those features of the model that could 
potentially rectify the problems associated with trade liberalization privatization, and 
financial deregulation. 
 
ALBA in Theory 
In an interview with Marta Harnecker (2005), Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 
explained the philosophy behind the creation of ALBA.  Chavez expressed that ALBA 
can be understood as an attempt to reclaim the original vision set forth by Simon Bolivar, 
the 19th century revolutionary that liberated South America from Spanish rule.  According 
to Chavez, the guiding theme of Bolivar’s philosophy was South American integration.  
Bolivar envisioned the creation of a political, economic, and military unity between the 
regions of South America in order to confront the challenges posed by external political 
threats, especially imperial intrusion  “We are trying to go back to this idea”, Chavez 
expressed.  “That is where we came up with the idea of ALBA.  We would have to 
reexamine those historic documents, reconsider the whole concept… To do something 
new, we would have to begin by recognizing the failures of the neoliberal capitalist 
models of integration” (Harnecker 2005: 120-121).  
For Chavez, the problem with neoliberal integration was that it was directed by, 
and on behalf, of the international and domestic capitalist classes.  The motivation behind 
ALBA was to “invert this equation”, i.e., to foster cooperation and integration between 
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countries in the interest of popular sectors, or in Chavez’s terms, “collaboration with the 
cavalry in front.”  According to Chavez, the neoliberal model has “the equation 
backwards…We have to invert it. We have to retake politics.  It requires that statesmen, 
politicians with a grand vision, begin making decisions” (Harnecker 2005: 121). 
In 2004, Venezuela and Cuba, established twelve cardinal principles that 
attempted to develop this neo-Bolivarian form of integration further by specifying how it 
might be put into practice.  This initial ALBA declaration highlighted twelve cardinal 
principles that would serve as guidelines for the implementation of the ALBA. According 
to the first principle, “trade and investment should not be an end in itself but a tool to 
achieve just and sustainable development”. The second principle holds that economic 
integration should provide “special and differential treatment that takes into account the 
level of development of diverse countries and the dimensions of their economies.”  
Extending this principle, the third principle holds that integration should be based on 
“economic cooperation between participant countries and not competition between 
countries and productions.” Other principles include: the imperative to create regional 
investment with the objective of reducing dependence on foreign investment, production 
for regional necessities with the objective of reducing dependence on foreign imports, 
integrate member countries through joint ventures in the areas of communications, 
transportation and energy, and create a development bank to finance regional 
development projects and to transfer financial resources to those countries with the 
greatest disparities.  Below I provide a complete list of the guiding principles of the 2004 
declaration (ALBA 2004).  
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1.Trade and investment should not be ends in themselves, but tools to achieve just and 
sustainable development, since the true Latin American and Caribbean integration 
cannot be the blind child of market or a mere strategy to expand foreign markets or 
stimulate trade. To this end, the State’s effective involvement is required as a regulating 
and coordinating agent of the economic activity.  
2. Special and differential treatment that takes into account the development degree of the 
different countries and the sizes of their economies, and guarantees access to all nations 
that are benefited by the integration process.  
3. Economic complementarity and cooperation among the involved countries and non-
competition among countries and productions, so that a productive, efficient, and 
competitive specialization is promoted that is consistent with each country’s balanced 
economic development, with the strategies to fight poverty, and the preservation of the 
peoples’ cultural identity. 
4. Cooperation and solidarity that are expressed in special plans aimed at the least 
developed countries in the region, including a Continental Plan to fight illiteracy, based 
on modern technologies that were already tested in Venezuela; a free health care plan in 
Latin America for the citizens that do not enjoy this service, and a plan to award regional 
grants in the main areas concerning economic and social development.  
5. Organization of the Social Emergency Fund. 
6. Integration of communication and transportation means throughout Latin American 
and Caribbean countries that includes joint plans for the construction of roads, railways, 
sea and airways, telecommunications, etc. 
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7. Actions aimed at favoring a sustainable development by means of rules intended to 
protect the environment, promoting the rational use of resources, and avoid proliferation 
of wasteful consumption patterns that are alien to the realities of our peoples.  
8. Energy integration among the region’s countries that guarantees the stable supply of 
energy products for the benefit of the Latin American and Caribbean societies, as it is 
promoted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with the creation of Petroamérica. 
9. Promotion of Latin American capital investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
with a view to reducing the dependence of the countries in the region on foreign 
investors. To this end, a Latin American Investment Fund, a Development Bank of the 
South, and the Society of Latin American Reciprocal Guarantees, among others, would be 
set up.  
10. Defense of the Latin American and Caribbean culture and of the identity of the 
peoples in the region, with particular respect for and promotion of the autochthonous and 
indigenous cultures and organization of the Televisora del Sur (TELESUR), as an 
alternative instrument to disseminate our realities.  
11. Actions that allow intellectual property rules to protect the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries’ patrimony against the voracity of the transnational corporations 
but that, at the same time, do not prevent the necessary cooperation in all areas among 
our countries. 
12. Harmonizing of stances in the multilateral sphere and in all kinds of negotiation 
processes with countries and blocs from other regions, including the fight for 
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democratization and the international organizations transparency, particularly the UN 
and its agencies.   
 
Grannacionale (in theory) 
In accordance with the guiding principles of the 2004 declaration, a supranational 
architecture was designed to facilitate the integration process between ALBA nations. 
The architecture is based on the concept of “Grannacionale”. In an abstract sense, 
Grannacionale refers to the overall political and economic alliance between ALBA 
countries and emphasizes the common vision and strategy they share for providing for 
their peoples (ALBA 2008). The concept draws on Bolivar’s original vision of regional 
integration and also addresses the necessity of doing so in the interest of popular sectors, 
i.e., “with the Calvary in front.”  “Grannacionale” also has a more practical application 
that refers to the concrete inter-state programs and joint ventures designed to address the 
immediate challenges confronting ALBA nations (more below).   
 
Comparison of the Theoretical Orientations of ALBA and Neoliberalism. 
The theoretical distinctions between ALBA and neoliberalism are relatively 
explicit.  As we will recall, neoliberalism contends that overall human well-being is best 
advanced when individuals make choices on behalf of their own self interest.  According 
to this theory, free competition among and between sellers and buyers will provide the 
most efficient allocation of societies productive resources, however unintentional this 
may be from the standpoint of individual actors.  The goal for neoliberals, then, is to 
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establish an institutional framework comprised of free markets, free trade, and private 
property rights, in order to maximize entrepreneurial freedom and ensure the best possible 
outcomes for society at large. The state’s role is largely relegated to opening up new 
markets where they do not exist and protecting existing ones.  However, state intervention 
into markets (once created) is seen as inhibiting the development and expansion of 
market-based solutions (Harvey 2007:22).   
 The theoretical distinctions between ALBA and neoliberalism are most apparent 
when one looks at the guiding principles of the initial ALBA declaration.  The first 
principle in the ALBA declaration holds that “just and sustainable development … can 
not be the blind child of the market.”  Rather,  “…the state’s effective involvement is 
required as a regulating and coordinating agent of economic activity.”  In essence, 
ALBA’s philosophy is very similar to the ideology of the development era, in that both 
models make an explicit call for the state to direct a national development agenda.  There 
are differences, however, with respect to the emphasis that ALBA places on “regional 
integration” and “cooperation and non-competition”.  In this sense, ALBA goes beyond 
the narrower confines of a national development agenda towards a development agenda 
for the region.  Such a unifying political stance no doubt resonates with other Latin 
American countries that have suffered from neoliberal reform.  With respect to the 
theoretical distinctions between ALBA and neoliberalism, the differences are most clear 
when one looks at the underlying principles and strategies that each model adheres to.  
Whereas neoliberal theory contends that overall economic development is best advanced 
in a manner that allows everyone to pursue their own self-interest, ALBA holds that 
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economic development should be directed by principles that are based on “cooperation” 
and “non-competition”.  Whereas neoliberal theory argues that markets should be opened 
to free competition, ALBA insists that trade should be based on “special and differential 
treatment that takes into account the development degrees” of different actors.  Whereas 
neoliberal theory denounces state regulation, as to allow for market based solutions,   
ALBA explicitly calls for the “state’s effective involvement” in initiating and directing 
the development process; this also includes guaranteeing basic human services such as 
healthcare and education for citizenries.  
 
ALBA in Practice  
This section of the thesis will concentrate on the concrete architecture of ALBA as 
a model of development.  The following analyses will break down the actual agreements 
and projects that have materialized between member countries. Below I highlight three 
fundamental components of the ALBA model:  Grannacionales, The Peoples Trade 
Agreement (TCP), and the Bank of ALBA.  These three features currently comprise the 
fundamental architecture through which ALBA’s economic and social projects are being 
implemented. A breakdown of the terms and conditions of the economic and social 
projects that have materialized under these structures will allow for a better understanding 
of the extent to which ALBA is (or isn’t) materializing along the course that is consistent 
with the guiding principles of the initial declaration.  Following that, I compare these 
three aspects of ALBA with the features of the neoliberal model that were highlighted in 
the previous chapter: Privatization, Trade Liberalization, and Financial Deregulation.   
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Grannacionale (in practice) 
As mentioned above, Grannacionale also has a more practical application that 
refers to the concrete inter-state programs and joint ventures designed to address the 
immediate challenges confronting ALBA nations.  This practical side includes everything 
from the provision of basic human services (e.g., literacy, education and healthcare) to the 
development of strategic sectors of ALBA economies (e.g., food, industry, petrochemical 
and steel production).  The sectors that have been identified for development are denoted 
by the following terms: ALBA Education, ALBA Culture, ALBA Trade, ALBA Finance, 
ALBA Food, ALBA Health, ALBA Telecommunications, ALBA Transportation, ALBA 
Tourism, ALBA Mining, ALBA Industry, and ALBA Energy (ALBA 2007).  
Grannacionales can be further divided into two groups, Company Grannacionales 
and Program Grannacionales. The philosophy behind these institutions is intended to be 
consistent with the 2004 declaration.  In essence, these programs and companies consist 
of joint efforts, directed toward the development of strategic sectors of ALBA nations. 
The development of these sectors is achieved through cooperation and the rational 
exploitation of respective countries’ advantages, including: expertise, raw materials, 
finance, and scientific and technological development (ALBA 2007). These programs and 
companies are collectively owned by ALBA states (bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral 
ownership), with 51 percent of the generated revenue going to the host country (ALBA 
2006).     
The development of Grannacionales marks an overall shift towards the 
nationalization of strategic sectors of ALBA economies.  Unlike the privatization 
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schemes that accompanied the neoliberal model of development, both the production and 
revenue that these companies produce are directed toward the immediate needs of 
member countries’ populations. To the extent that these companies become more efficient 
and are capable of producing surpluses, production will be directed toward the 
international market (ALBA 2008).  The cost of the goods and services produced will be 
subsidized to ensure sufficient allocation.   
With respect to Program Grannacionales, such as ALBA Health and ALBA 
Education, these services are being provided free of charge to the populations of member 
countries. One of the strategic aims of Grannacionales is to establish lateral linkages 
between countries so as to maximize employment opportunities and the overall 
development of ALBA nations (ALBA 2008).  The idea is for one Grannacionale to 
produce a good or service that can be utilized by another Grannacionale for either further 
production, distribution, or retail.  For example, the companies that comprise ALBA 
Industry can exchange with the companies that comprise ALBA transportation, which can 
exchange with state-run retail stores that comprise ALBA Trade.  The objective is to 
develop a dynamic and interlocking system of production and distribution for the mutual 
benefit of ALBA nations.  
The Fifth ALBA Summit in April of 2007 focused on furthering the development 
of Grannacionales in the area of energy.  Agreements were signed to construct six oil 
refineries in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominica, and Cuba (ALBA 2007).  In 
addition, member nations agreed to build a regional energy system that replaces oil with 
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natural gas to meet domestic energy needs.29  Such an energy shift will ensure that 
regional demand for oil does not limit international sales.  Agreements also extend Cuba’s 
health and educational services to all ALBA member countries, including Caribbean 
nations that make up Petrocaribe              
At the first official meeting of the ALBA Technical Committee in July of 2007, 
representatives discussed plans for the future development of Grannacionales in the areas 
of trade, transportation, mining, energy, technology, telecommunications, industry, 
science, health, tourism, finance and finance.  Representatives also discussed plans to 
create an inter-ALBA market in which case the products produced by Grannacionales 
would not be limited to meeting demands of member counties but would also be directed 
toward export.  Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro stated that Grannacionales 
will eventually become self-sustaining and competitive on the international market, 
especially those involved technology, raw materials, and financial sectors (Carlson 2007).   
Three months after the ALBA Technical Committee made its announcements, Cuba and 
Venezuela began construction on a joint oil refinery. They also signed joint contracts to 
explore for oil in Cuban Territories.  To integrate their telecommunication systems, the 
two countries announced the construction of an underwater fiber optic system.  The two 
countries also agreed to begin construction of joint industries for the production of 
cement, stainless steel, and nickel. To complement a fishing industry, the two nations 
agreed to begin construction of a ship building industry (Recent agreements signed 
between Cuba and Venezuela).  
                                                 
29 Venezuela has started a joint project with Argentina to produce natural gas automobile motors with 
technology they have acquired from Iran. See: Chris Carlson (2007d)  
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In December of 2007, during the Fourth Summit of Petrocaribe, a new agreement 
was signed between Venezuela and members of Petrocaribe to create a fund so that 
Caribbean nations can finance their own energy projects.  Member countries along with 
Cuba and Venezuela also agreed upon an initiative to provide technical and professional 
development for citizens in the energy sector (Janicke 2007). The summit closed with a 
celebration of the reopening of Cuba’s Camilo Ceinfeugos oil refinery, another joint 
project between Cuba and Venezuela (the old refinery shut down after the cessation of 
subsidized oil following the collapse of the Soviet Union).  The renovated refinery will 
employ 1,200 people (Janicke 2007).   
In October of 2008, using Venezuela’s technical assistance and oil exploration 
technology, Cuba discovered an offshore oil well estimated to hold 20 billion barrels of 
oil reserves.  Rafael Tenreyro, the exploration manger of Cuba’s state owned oil company 
(Cubapetroleo) has stated that drilling will begin before the second quarter of next year 
(Roy 2008).  It is not yet clear how Cuba’s newfound oil wealth will impact ALBA.  If 
proven, these reserves will allow Cuba to meet all of its energy needs and should provide 
enough export revenue to finance both national development projects, as well as 
contribute to the many bilateral Grannacionales developed with Venezuela.  
Alternatively, Cuba could potentially take some of the burden off of Venezuela by selling 
a portion of the oil at preferential rates to other ALBA member countries, or contribute to 
ALBA’s development fund by depositing portions of the revenue in the Bank of ALBA 
(More about the Bank of ALBA below).  Cuba’s oil discovery is an example of how the 
ALBA model can potentially reduce the asymmetries existing between member countries 
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by transferring expertise and resources from more developed nations to less developed 
nations.  See Appendix 1 for a list of Grannacionales currently underway.   
Two other important pieces of ALBA’s architecture are the Peoples Trade 
Agreement (TCP) and the Bank of ALBA.  The former is a feature of ALBA Trade and 
the latter a feature of ALBA Finance.  Although both these institutions reside within the 
overall framework of Grannacionale, each deserves their own consideration given their 
overall strategic significance.   
 
The Peoples Trade Agreement (TCP) 
The TCP is a trade initiative comprised of bartering arrangements that capitalize 
on each country’s comparative advantage.  The trade agreements that fall under the 
auspices of the TCP are tailored to ensure mutual benefit, employment expansion, access 
to markets, and resource conservation (ALBA 2006).  In accordance with second 
principle of the 2004 declaration, the terms of trade are based on “special and differential 
treatment”.  The degree of special treatment a member country has access to is determined 
by variables such as population, total production, endowment of resources, the overall 
degree of industrial development, structural limitations of the economies with respect to 
composition of exports and external vulnerability, per capita income and poverty 
(Bancoex 2004).  Under the TCP, ALBA countries barter goods and/or services that they 
specialize in, for goods and/or services they lack.  The TCP has produced a wide range of 
bartering agreements that have included the exchange of foodstuffs, technology, 
infrastructure, health and human services, petrochemicals, raw materials, financial 
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resources, and the list is still longer.  For a list of some of the more significant bartering 
arrangements that have been established to date see Appendix 2. 
Many bartering agreements signed under the TCP are also features of other 
Grannacionales.  In some instances they are the mechanism through which 
Grannacionales develop.  For example, Mission Robinson I, the literacy program 
provided by Cuba in exchange for subsidized Venezuelan oil (at $27 a barrel) is 
technically part of the TCP.  However, since 2007 these services have been expanded 
with the help of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua to include all ALBA nations, thereby 
advancing the development of ALBA Education.  Likewise Mission Robinson II (Cuba’s 
elementary education program) and Mission Ribas (Cuba’s higher education program) 
have also been extended to all ALBA nations under the auspices ALBA Education 
(ALBA 2007). With respect to ALBA Health, its development has been greatly advanced 
via Barrio Adentro (Cuba’s medical care service) and Operation Miracle (Cuba’s 
ophthalmology services).  As with the programs that make up ALBA Education, these 
services also started out as bilateral bartering agreements between Cuba and Venezuela, 
following the signing of the 2004 declaration.  
In June 2005, Venezuela sought to extend its bartering relations to other countries 
of the Caribbean.  Venezuela’s state owned oil company PDVSA and fourteen Caribbean 
nations formed a bartering arrangement known as Petrocaribe.  Like Cuba, these nations 
get Venezuelan oil at preferential prices (40% discount off of the market price) in 
exchange for foodstuffs. Cheap loans from Venezuela finance the purchase of oil. 
Countries have 25 years to pay the loan back at one-percent interest (ALBA 2005).   
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In April of 2006, Bolivia, signed on to the People’s Trade Agreement (TCP).  As part of 
this agreement, Venezuela and Cuba agreed to barter for Bolivia’s soy and meat products. 
Cuba agreed to exchange its health and educational resources and Venezuela agreed to 
provide Bolivia with subsidized oil and technical assistance for the exploration and 
extraction of petrochemicals (ALBA 2006).   
 
The Bank of ALBA 
In January of 2008, the Bank of ALBA was founded at the Sixth ALBA Summit. 
The Bank of ALBA was designed to establish a new financial architecture in accordance 
with the 2004 declaration.  The bank’s goal is to promote sustainable economic and 
human development, as well as advance economic integration between member countries 
(ALBA 2008).  The institution will provide finance for development projects throughout 
the region, including the development of Grannacionales.  The Bank of ALBA will 
purportedly provide low cost credit to member countries with flexible repayment plans 
that do not subject borrowing countries to the conditions international lending institutions 
have imposed in the past (ALBA 2008).   
There appears to be a tension between the autonomous aims of the member 
governments and the project priorities of ALBA’s leadership.  According to Nicaraguan 
representative, Alberto Guevara, the aid can be directed toward whatever priorities the 
borrowing country chooses (Carlson 2007).  However, according to official documents, 
one of the main objectives of the bank is to provide finance for the development of 
program and company Grannacionales (ALBA 2008). 
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  The organizational structure of the Bank of ALBA is based on a two-tier system 
comprised of a ministerial council and an executive. The executive position will rotate 
between representatives of each member country (ALBA 2008).  The bank started with an 
initial sum of $1 billion dollars provided by Venezuela. This amount is expected to grow 
with the contributions of other member countries as development projects generate 
revenue, but there is no public schedule for such contributions.  The banks operations will 
purportedly be run democratically, and each member country will have equal 
participation in the decision making process.  A steady deposit of petrodollars should 
ensure that member countries are provided with adequate amounts of low cost credit. 
One of the Banks’ first major projects has been the development of an ALBA food 
security fund.  The food security fund will not only provide subsidies for state agriculture 
production, but also provide finance for small and medium scale producers who do not 
have access to credit through private banks (ALBA 2008a). ALBA’s food security fund is 
part of a larger effort to respond to the global food crisis that started in early 2008.  Since 
the beginning of the global food crisis, many developing countries have witnessed a sharp 
rise in the cost of imported food, with some regions having to deal with food shortages.  
After food shortages sparked riots in Haiti, ALBA nations joined together to send 365 
tons of chicken, ham, milk, lentils, olive oil, and vegetables to Haiti, which has been 
experiencing violent food riots over increases in the cost of food (Suggett 2008).   
As a development model, ALBA is comprehensive in scope.  ALBA’s structural 
design is comprised of an egalitarian system of trade, cooperative projects geared toward 
the development of strategic sectors of ALBA nation’s economies, and a financial 
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architecture designed to facilitate the development process and promote basic food 
security of ALBA nations.  Indeed, part of ALBA’s distinctiveness lies in its explicit 
focus on human well-being, as exemplified by its free healthcare and education programs 
for citizenries. Unfortunately, at the present juncture, it is difficult to tell how much has 
been accomplished with respect to all of the proposals and agreements signed.  More data 
will need to be collected in order to make a comprehensive evaluation of ALBA’s 
development and success.  The difficulty of not having up-to date information, 
necessarily limits the analysis in the following chapter, where I compare, in broad terms, 















Chapter 5  
ALBA and Neoliberalism 
The formation of ALBA has marked the return of state-centered development in 
Latin America.  However, what makes ALBA distinct from the old, state-centered, model 
of ISI is its regional focus.  Not only are ALBA nations heavily involved in joint efforts 
to develop strategic sectors of their economies (Grannacionales), they have also carefully 
designed trade agreements (TCP), and created a financial architecture that will facilitate 
such development (The Bank of ALBA).  Unlike neoliberal-led globalization whereby 
profits are pursued at the expense of lesser-developed nations, ALBA points toward a 
more egalitarian mode of integration, whereby states reserve their sovereign right to 
coordinate economic activity for the benefit of their peoples.  With respect to economic 
relations between member countries, ALBA’s (current) mode of integration is not based 
on competition but rather on complementarity. ALBA’s design is such that it fosters a 
vested interest on the part of member countries for mutual  cooperation. Grannacionales, 
for instance, is a mechanism by which member countries become joint stakeholders in the 
development of social programs and industry.  Likewise, the TCP is comprised of 
mutually beneficial bartering arrangements whereby countries exchange goods and 
service that they have for those that they lack.  Under these agreements, the terms and 
conditions of trade are based on partial and differential treatment that takes into account 
economic disparities between trading countries. 
The overall human dimension of ALBA is a defining characteristic that separates 
it from traditional development models. For the first time some of the poorest peoples in 
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the entire region have access to free healthcare and a college education.  In 2005, 
Operation Miracle provided more than 200,000 eye operations in Venezuela alone 
(Anderson 2006).  By 2007, Barrio Adentro had carried out 60 million medical 
treatments.  Since the implementation of these services, infant mortality has decreased in 
Caracas by 75 percent (Carlson 2007).  Likewise, Mission Sucre has proven to be a 
success.  In October of 2008 the scholarship program graduated 5,949 students in the 
areas of administration, computing, social communication, agriculture production, 
environmental management, and management for local development.  Mission Sucre 
currently has 527,134 students enrolled, with another 108,000 registered to enroll 
(Pearson 2008).       
This human dimension is exemplified not only in the free healthcare and 
education programs, but also in the inclusion of participatory democracy within the 
governing architecture. ALBA’s incorporation of grassroots organizations and social 
movements is part of a broader agenda aimed at promoting participatory democracy 
within its overall development schema (Harris and Azzi 2006).  The capacity in which 
social movements are participating in the decision making process is significant.  
According to Hattingh, an oil pipeline that Chavez wanted to build between Venezuela 
and Argentina was stopped due to opposition by a Venezuelan social movement, which 
argued that the construction of the pipeline would destroy indigenous peoples’ land. 
Finally, after a long battle with the Venezuelan government, the project was shelved. By 
promoting the inclusion of grassroots organizations and social movements, and 
demonstrating that their involvement is meaningful, ALBA can continue to increase its 
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legitimacy and gain the support of local actors which can serve as a powerful political 
base for its expansion. 
 
Grannacionalization Vs Privatization 
The development of Grannacionales is part of a larger state strategy aimed at 
recovering the main levers of the economy from the private sector.  With the elections of 
Chavez and Morales, the nationalization of hydrocarbons and other strategic sectors are 
once again playing a pivotal role in the region’s development strategies.  With respect to 
Venezuela, rent is being collected from the state oil company PDVSA, to finance the 
development of public healthcare and education, as well the development of strategic 
sectors of the economy.  This would have been unthinkable under the neoliberal 
privatization schemes, which drastically reduced the revenue that the state collected from 
the oil sector.30 With respect to ALBA Health and ALBA Education, these joint 
government programs were designed to provide basic human services that the neoliberal 
market had failed to allocate for a large majority of Latin Americans.31 For the first time 
some of the poorest peoples in the entire region have access to free healthcare and a 
college education.  In 2005, Operation Miracle provided more than 200,000 eye 
operations in Venezuela alone (Anderson 2006).  By 2007, Barrio Adentro had carried 
out 60 million medical treatments.  Since the implementation of these services, infant 
mortality has decreased in Caracas by 75 percent (Carlson 2007).  Likewise, Mission 
                                                 
30 When Venezuela’s oil fields were opened up to transnational oil companies in the 1990’s, government 
royalties amounted to 1 percent of the total value of the oil extracted (Venezuelan Embassy 2008).  




Sucre has proven to been a success.  In October of 2008 the scholarship program 
graduated 5,949 students in the areas of administration, computing, social 
communication, agriculture production, environmental management, and management for 
local development.  Mission Sucre currently has 527,134 students enrolled, with another 
108,000 registered to enroll (Pearson 2008).     
What makes ALBA’s push toward nationalization different from the old ISI model 
is that it is a strategy that transcends national boundaries. Indeed, the increase in state 
owned enterprises is being ushered in through cooperative agreements across national 
borders. With the development of Grannacionales, ALBA states are pursuing cooperative 
agreements with one another to create a whole chain of inter-state companies. 
Grannacionales, if they develop in accordance with ALBA’s guiding principles, will 
provide the opportunity for ALBA countries to develop collectively by “joining forces” as 
oppose to each country having to bear the burden alone, or rely on transnational 
companies and foreign investors.  Such a strategy no doubt has potential, given that, 
together, ALBA nations comprise a block that is rich in natural, human, and financial 
resources.  
The regional objective is to establish lateral linkages in and between ALBA 
countries so as to maximize employment opportunities and the overall development of 
ALBA nations. The goods and services produced in these companies are first and 
foremost intended to meet the needs of ALBA nations’ citizenries.  As such 
Grannacionales are intended to be the fundamental instruments comprising an ALBA fair 
trade block (ALBA 2008).  Prices will be subsidized to ensure ample distribution, rather 
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than in accordance with the profit logic of capital accumulation. This also marks an 
important distinction between Grannacionalization and privatization.  Under the 
neoliberal model, once public enterprises become privatized, they were governed by the 
profit motive.  Higher profits are almost always attained at the expense of workers who 
lose jobs and consumers who pay higher prices (Reygadas 2006:135).  With 
Grannacionales, however, the important thing is not the maximization of the rate of profit 
but rather simple reproduction.  The main aim is to generate employment and provide 
affordable goods and services to ALBA citizenries in an economically sustainable 
manner.  However as surpluses become available they will be directed toward 
international markets.  To the extent that profits are realized, they can either be channeled 
back into production, public programs and services or into the development of other 
strategic sectors of the economy. 
 
The TCP Vs Liberalized Trade  
Trade liberalization in Latin America consisted in the opening of developing 
nations’ economies to powerful foreign competitors. After the removal of protectionist 
measures (i.e., subsidies, tariffs, and import restrictions) countless domestic producers 
were displaced, which lead to deindustrialization in some regions and food shortages in 
others (SAPRIN 2004).  In addition to the challenges that confronted the domestic 
economy, export sectors often had difficulty competing with the heavily subsidized 
industries in developed countries’ economies.  This aspect of foreign competition, in both 
domestic and international markets, marks a categorical distinction between neoliberal 
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FTA’s and the TCP.  Under the TCP, trade does not consist of nations competing for 
market share. Rather, trade is established through bartering arrangements based on  “ 
beneficial and productive complementation”, with “special and preferential treatment” for 
less developed nations (Venezuela and Cuban delegations 2005).  Because the TCP is 
designed as a bartering arrangement, it not only opens markets between member 
countries, it actually ensures exchange.  That is to say, instead of letting market forces 
dictate the level of economic activity between nations, sales are actually guaranteed up 
front by governments’ commitments to purchase (Montano: 2006).  For example, after the 
Colombia quit importing Bolivian soy, Bolivia signed a TCP wherein Venezuela and 
Cuba made a commitment up front to buy and barter for all of Bolivia’s soy produce. 
(Bolivia signs on to the TCP 2006).     
Another crucial feature of the TCP is that it does not try to impose general 
obligations on signatory countries.  Although it has been a standard practice thus far for 
member countries to remove all tariff and non- tariff barriers, the TCP recognizes and 
respects the sovereign right of states to employ and regulate tariffs, subsidies or price 
controls for the protection of national economies (Bancoex 2004, Montano 2006).  Hence, 
the TCP does not pursue integration at the expense of national sovereignty. 
Bartering arrangements under the TCP frequently involve technology exchange and 
technical assistance.  One prominent example is Petrocaribe.  In this agreement 
subsidized Venezuelan oil is sent to poor nations in the Caribbean in exchange for basic 
foodstuffs.  Part of this agreement also involves technological cooperation and financial 
assistance so that these nations can develop their own oil-extracting capability.  Another 
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example is the 2006 TCP agreement signed between Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba 
wherein Venezuela donated an asphalt plant to Bolivia for road construction and 
maintenance, as well as technology to renovate Bolivia’s state oil company, YPFB.   
The TCP is a system of trade that is specifically tailored to foster the development 
of strategic sectors.  As with Grannacionales, the goals of the TCP are to foster economic 
development through the creation of lateral linkages between member countries so that 
the dependence on foreign imports and markets can be broken.  Unfortunately, current 
bartering arrangements do not fully provide member nations with all their basic needs; 
hence, the development of Grannacionales will be crucial if ALBA member countries are 
going to break their reliance on foreign markets. 
 
The Bank of ALBA Vs Financial Deregulation  
As discussed in the previous chapters, one of the main reasons that Latin 
American nations have agreed to IMF-led SAPs stems from their dependence on 
international finance.  As Mark Weisbrot (2006:4) has stated:  
The IMF was the ‘gatekeeper’ for most other sources of credit for developing 
country governments.  If a government did not reach an agreement with the IMF, 
it would not be eligible for most lending from the Worlds Bank, regional banks, 
such as the important Inter-American Development Bank in this hemisphere, G-7 
government loans and grants, and even the private sector.  
 
One feature of the SAP reform package required developing nations to open their capital 
accounts to foreign investment with little, if any, regulations on the entry and exit of 
capital.  This was imposed as a means for developing nations to contribute to their own 
financial inflows (Soederberg 2004: 38). With respect to foreign lenders, the liberalization 
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of capital accounts made for less risky investments, with quicker turnovers, than 
traditional loans had provided (Gowan 1999).  Private investors and hedge fund operators 
looking to diversify their portfolios could now lend to developing nations through the 
purchase of government securities, which could be withdrawn at their discretion (Gowan 
1999: 41).   
 The reason why this strategy is particularly antagonistic to the real economy is 
that it obliges governments to abandon their role in allocating financial resources for 
productive sectors.  In order to attract investment, governments are obliged to maintain 
high interest rates and restrict financial flows into long-term productive projects 
(Villarreal 1990).  Furthermore, high rates of investment into government bonds tend to 
create huge economic imbalances.  The influx of foreign capital pressures the currency to 
appreciate, which undermines the competitiveness of the export sector while 
simultaneously encouraging excessive importing.  As the balance of payments go into the 
negative, investors risk devaluation and consequently are obliged to pull their money out, 
resulting in capital flight.     
 Fortunately for ALBA nations, a new source of international finance has emerged 
that has allowed developing nations to eschew the IMF-led SAPs. The Bank of ALBA 
provides finance that isn’t contingent upon the adoption of structural reforms. Hence, 
ALBA nations can secure financial inflows without having to sacrifice their economies to 
foreign competition, privatization schemes, or money speculators.  According to ALBA 
officials, one of the main purposes of the bank is to provide developing nations with an 
alternative to the World Bank and the IMF. They argue that the Bank will provide 
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financial resources under conditions that are not damaging to the region (Carlson 2007). 
The Bank of ALBA will purportedly provide financial resources for productive 
investment at a very low interest rate, and with flexible repayment plans (6th ALBA 
Summit). According to Nicaraguan representative, Alberto Guevara, the aid can be 
directed toward whatever priorities the borrowing country chooses (Carlson 2007f).  
However, one of the main objectives of the bank is to provide finance for the 
development of Grannacionales (ALBA 2008).  
 The Bank of ALBA is also one important feature of Venezuela’s larger regional 
objective aimed at breaking Latin America’s dependence on the IMF and US financial 
institutions.  Since the re-nationalization of its state oil company (PDVSA)), Venezuela 
has used its windfall oil profits to reconfigure the region’s financial architecture 
(Weisbrot 2006).  In 2005, 80 percent of the IMF’s outstanding loans (totaling $81 
billion) were directed to Latin American countries.  By 2007, Latin America accounted 
for only 1 percent of total IMF lending.  Today, Pakistan and Turkey account for nearly 
all of the IMF’s $17 billion in outstanding loans (Lendman 2007).  Argentina officially 
withdrew from the IMF in December of 2005, after paying off its total debt of $9.8 
billion.  Venezuela contributed $2.5 billion to the cause, and Chavez announced that 
Venezuela would provide additional funds if Argentina needed it (Weisbrot 2006:8).   
Ecuador has also sought greater independence from the IMF.  In 2005, Ecuador cleared 
its IMF debt and suspended World Bank loans.  Venezuela assisted by agreeing to 
purchase $300 million of Ecuador’s bonds.  However, as it turned out there was plenty of 
demand for Ecuador’s bonds and Venezuela only needed to buy $25million (Weisbrot 
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2006: 8). In 2005 alone, Venezuela directed an estimated $9 billion to financial services 
in the region.   
 In December 2007, Venezuela teamed up with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Uruguay, and Paraguay to create a regional development bank known as the 
Banco del Sur Bank of the South. Initially there were differences that threatened to throw 
the whole project into disarray.  Venezuela and Brazil disagreed over the projects main 
objective and who should be included in the official membership.  Brazil wanted the 
scope of the project limited to South America, while Venezuela wanted to include Central 
America and the Caribbean (Romero 2007).  According to Vince McElhinny, an analyst 
at the Bank Information Center (a Washington based think tank that tracks development 
Banks), Venezuela’s focus was on egalitarian principles and regional solidarity, whereas 
Brazil was pursuing a more conservative agenda (Romero 2007). Venezuelan Finance 
Minister Rodrigo Cabezas has avowed: “There will be no credit subjected to economic 
policies.  There will be no credit that produces calamity for our people and as a result, it 
will not be a tool of domination like the international lending agencies” (Lendman 
2007:3).  
 In other financial developments, Venezuela announced in August that it would 
nationalize the privately owned Bank of Venezuela.  It’s not yet known if this bank will 
have an egalitarian focus or if it will strictly pursue commercial objectives; nevertheless, 
it poses an additional challenge to the IMF and the US based financial institutions that 
have dominated international finance over the last three decades. According to Latin 
American economist Mark Weisbrot, the diminishing role of the IMF is as historically 
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significant as the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system (Weisbrot 
2006: 7).  This institution no longer has the power to dictate to Latin American nations 
how to run their economies. With access to an alternative source of financing, 
governments are beginning to assume greater control over the development of their 
economies, as exemplified by the growing number of nationalizations in Bolivia, 
Argentina, and Ecuador.  The recent economic restructurings that have taken place with 
respect to states pursuing their own development agendas has been greatly facilitated by 
Venezuela’s emergence as regional lender.  The financial agreements listed above 
indicate that Venezuela’s efforts to promote regional solidarity and cooperation go well 
beyond the confines of ALBA.  As we will soon see, this is also evident with respect to 
trade among non-ALBA nations.  
 
Regional Participation 
 At the current juncture ALBA does not constitute a region-wide alternative, as 
Venezuela and Cuba have only been able to secure the signatures of the least developed 
countries of the region.  The development of ALBA might potentially be advanced if 
industrial powerhouses such as Brazil and Argentina were brought into the fold.  The 
technological capacity of these two countries could provide invaluable support, both in 
terms of technology sharing and training, for ALBA’s less developed nations.   Certainly 
without the involvement of other wealthier nations in the region, the development of 
ALBA will greatly depend on Venezuela. However, this might not be as debilitating as it 
appears at first sight. Brazil’s commitment to its commercial objectives (as expressed in 
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its initial agenda for the Bank of the South as well as the spats that it has had with less 
developed countries over the particulars of free trade agreements) could prevent it from 
taking on a meaningful role in such an accord.  The high degree of preferential treatment 
that Brazil, as a more developed country, would be expected to grant less developed 
signatory countries, would likely stretch the limits of its humanitarian goodwill.  In fact, 
many of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s (known as Lula) economic policies 
represent a continuation of aspects of the neoliberal model, and his behavior towards 
other countries in the region has been ambiguous at best (Marques and Mendes 2007, DE 
Oliveira and Nakatani 2007, Prates and Paulani 2007, Stedile 2007).  With respect to the 
continuation of neoliberal policy, Brazil’s commitment to the domestic and international 
finance has significantly undermined the industrial sector.  The high interest rates that 
have been necessary to attract foreign investment into the Brazilian real, coupled with the 
associated appreciation of the real, “has resulted in a regressive specialization of Brazil’s 
industry, a loss of important capital and technology intensive sectors” (Prates and Paulani 
2007). Moreover, Brazil has continued to pursue gains through liberalized trade, 
particularly under the framework of the WTO, with the aim of securing greater access to 
North American and European markets for its exports (Harris and Azzi 2006).  This 
commitment has often strained relations between Brazil and its neighbors.  For example, 
at the 2006 WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, Brazil’s diplomats silenced both 
Venezuela and Cuba (who spoke out against the recent WTO proposal) in order to push 
forward a trade agreement with developed countries (Harris and Azzi 2006).  Perhaps 
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more explicit was Brazil’s willingness to command UN troops in Haiti.  According to 
Harris and Azzi (2006:19):   
The Brazilian command of UN troops in Haiti has been used by the US as a test of 
its regional leadership, and is used by Brazil as a point in favor of its ever growing 
demand- especially under Lula’s administration- for a permanent seat at the Un 
security council, with an eye to the remote chance that it might be expanded.     
 
If Brazil were to enter ALBA with the same inclinations, it could potentially foster 
division and undermine the model’s whole objective. On the other hand, Brazil has at 
times showed solidarity with its neighbors.  Brazil supported Venezuela and Ecuador 
when Colombia (with the support and assistance of the US) carried out a bombing raid on 
a FARC encampment inside Ecuadorian territory.  Following this incident, Brazil agreed 
to head up the South American Defense Council with Venezuela with the aim of 
protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations in the region.  Nevertheless, 
given its ambiguous behavior and its continued pursuit of neoliberal-style capitalism, it is 
unclear how Brazil’s membership would affect ALBA. 
 Interestingly enough, there are other nations in the region that are not official 
ALBA members, yet have developed bilateral arrangements (of both material and social 
exchange) with Venezuela that look very similar to the agreements that have been 
established under ALBA.  Venezuelan has a bartering arrangement with Argentina that 
involves the exchange of subsidized Venezuelan oil for Argentinean ships and foodstuffs 
(Kozloff 2008).  In addition, state officials, workers, and businessmen from Venezuela 
and Argentina have held forums to discuss types of cooperative measures that could 
facilitate economic and social integration between two countries.  One prominent 
example is the cooperative forums held between Venezuelan unions and Argentinean 
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workers, where workers are invited to speak about their experience of worker run 
factories in Argentina (Kozloff 2008).   
The bilateral bartering arrangements and joint ventures that have been established 
between Venezuela and Uruguay are another example of an ALBA- like agreement. Since 
August of 2007, Venezuela has sold subsidized petroleum to Uruguay in exchange for 
dairy cows.  The specificities of the agreement allow Uruguay to pay 75 percent of the 
cost up front and the remaining 25 percent over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of 2 
percent (Carlson 2007).  In addition, Venezuela and Uruguay have embarked on a series 
of joint venture projects including: a joint oil company between Venezuela’s state oil 
company PDVSA and the Uruguayan Ancap (an investment of more than $ 20 billion), 
the expansion of Uruguayan oil refinery that will double its productive capacity, and the 
construction of a natural gas refinery that will supply Uruguay with Venezuelan natural 
gas.  The two countries are also in the process of planning the construction of a joint 
factory that will produce insulin (Carlson 2007).  In support of the insulin factory Chavez 
asserted that it will “unhitch the region from the transnational medical companies that 
exploit out populations” (Carlson 2007). 
Finally, Venezuela and Ecuador have also been planning ambitious agreements 
aimed at both energy and economic integration.  One of the most important is the 
construction of a joint oil refinery in Ecuador that will process 300,000 barrels of oil a 
day, making it one of the largest in the region (Carlson 2007).  The two countries also 
have signed an agreement to promote the development of small and medium-sized 
industry in both Venezuela and Ecuador.        
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Although the agreements mentioned above have not been officially implemented 
under the ALBA framework (and more information is required to assess the particulars of 
these agreements) they are in many ways consistent with ALBA’s regional objective of 
fostering cooperation and solidarity between governments, economies, and peoples of the 
region. These agreements also contain elements found in the ALBA Declaration such as 
energy integration and economic complementarity based on comparative advantage.  
Aside from the fact that they are strictly bilateral as oppose to multilateral, the specific 
modes through which these interchanges take place, i.e., joint ventures and bartering 
arrangements are practically indistinguishable from Grannacionales and the TCP.  When 
one considers Venezuela’s financial and trading relations with non-member countries, 
ALBA, as an ideal of political and economic unity, seems to be also materializing outside 
the narrow confines of ALBA proper.  Indeed, whether a true region-wide alternative - 
consistent with the principles of solidarity, cooperation and mutually beneficial forms of 
economic integration- materializes in Latin America, may depend less on a growing 
number of countries signing the official ALBA declaration and more on the continuation 











Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have given a historical overview of Latin America’s attempt to 
achieve sustainable economic development since the postwar period.  Beginning with the 
“development era”, many Latin American nations implemented ISI strategies in the hopes 
of achieving a more independent and self-reliant model development.  However, the ISI 
strategy was only partially successful.  While many Latin American nations experienced 
unprecedented rates of growth and made significant strides toward industrializing, they 
were never able to break their dependence on foreign markets and financing.  
Consequently, the region accumulated considerable debt, which increased exponentially 
after the US unilaterally dissolved the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system.  
Ultimately, compounding debt, coupled with US interventionism (in Brazil, Chile, and 
Argentina) brought Latin America’s development era to a close.   
Beginning in the 1980s, heavily indebted nations, on the verge of economic 
collapse, were in desperate need of foreign investment and financial assistance.  In order 
to signal their investment and credit worthiness, Latin American nations were forced to 
adopt the neoliberal model of development, which involved a drastic restructuring of their 
economies.  The neoliberal model in effect took away the sovereign right of the state to 
plan, implement, and coordinate economic policy on behalf of the nation.  Under this 
model, foreign capital was to receive the same treatment as local capital.  The 
components of structural adjustment that I have highlighted throughout this thesis, 
namely trade liberalization, privatization, and financial deregulation are a reflection of 
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this.  These measures, in different ways, all amount to a removal of state regulation on the 
movement of foreign capital.  While these policies rewarded foreign-based transnationals 
and money speculators, these elements were particularly antagonistic to national 
economies.  The components of structural adjustment were largely responsible for the 
displacement of local industry and agriculture, while also increasing nations’ exposure to 
sporadic waves of capital flight.  In most cases the implementation of the neoliberal 
model has undermined stable economic growth and increased poverty and inequality 
throughout the region.  The effects have been particular hard on popular sectors.  
Unemployment, food shortages, increasing costs and limited access to basic human 
necessities such as water and electricity have all resulted from the implementation of 
neoliberal structural adjustment. 
 The deteriorating societal conditions that accompanied the neoliberal model 
produced discontent that has spread throughout Latin America.  This anti-neoliberal 
sentiment has opened up new spaces for discussion and debate about alternative 
development strategies for the region. At this same historical juncture, Venezuela has 
emerged as a regional lender and is promoting its own alternative: ALBA.  Venezuela’s 
abundant financial resources, in conjunction with ALBA, are providing the opportunity 
for developing nations to eschew IMF-led SAPs.  As I have attempted to demonstrate 
throughout this thesis, ALBA offers new opportunities for Latin American nations that 
did not previously exist under neoliberal structural adjustment.  However, ALBA is still 
in its infancy; and as of yet, it is too early to tell if it will realize its promise.  Below I 
highlight a number of contingencies that have implications for ALBA’s future. 
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How Viable is ALBA? 
What can be made of ALBA’s medium and long-term prospects? Although 
ALBA’s trade agreements, joint ventures, and financial architecture are designed in a 
manner that allows for cooperative management, democratic planning, and mutual 
benefit, it is reasonable to question the viability of an alternative that is comprised of such 
unequal countries.  Venezuela is certainly the most economically powerful member of 
ALBA and undoubtedly asserts more control over the course and direction of ALBA than 
any other member country.  In this context it is important to consider the extent to which 
Venezuela might be willing to exploit less developed member countries for its own 
advantage. Venezuela’s declining international standing (outside Latin America) may 
buffer such behavior considerably.  In other words, if Venezuela has any hope of 
establishing a national development project, in the face of US-led aggression, it continues 
to need the support and respect of its neighbors.  At this juncture, it appears that any 
exploitative actions by Venezuela toward other ALBA countries would not only be 
counter productive for ALBA but for Venezuela as well.   
If at some point Venezuela becomes unwilling to abide by ALBA’s guiding 
principles, member nations would likely be obliged to pursue other alternatives.  Besides 
Venezuela, other sources of finance and economic integration have recently emerged for 
Latin American nations.  Since 2006, European Banks have begun offering grants and 
loans to Bolivia without the IMF’s seal of approval (Weisbrot 2006:7).  Moreover, China, 
Iran, and Russia have all strengthened their political and economic ties to Latin America 
in the last few years.  Bolivia and Nicaragua are currently receiving financial assistance 
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from Iran (Erikson 2007). Russia was among the first to give Cuba financial assistance 
following the devastation left by two major hurricanes and had signed a number of 
agreements with Nicaragua this year (BBC 2008).  Not to be outdone, China has 
increased its trade with Latin America by $ 90 billion since 2000 (Painter 2008).  
Succinctly put, Venezuela and ALBA are not the only options available to developing 
nations in Latin America.     
Chavez has proven that he is willing to make concessions when other players 
oppose the adoption of particular measures that he favors.  Venezuela’s agreement to 
abandon the construction of the gas pipeline through the Amazon is one example.  If 
Venezuela is serious about furthering a regionally based development project based on 
mutual cooperation and respect for national sovereignty, then it will have to continue to 
take seriously the views held by other members in the governing structure.  The project 
itself will depend on it.   
 If ALBA continues to develop along its current path, whereby resources are 
transferred from the most developed nations to the least developed nations, then the huge 
power asymmetries that exist between Venezuela and other ALBA nations could 
potentially dissolve over time.  The fact that Cuba will soon begin developing its own oil 






ALBA represents the most concrete and comprehensive state-run development 
model in Latin America since the ISI model.  The early chapters of this thesis explored 
the challenges that confronted ISI and the reasons why it ultimately failed.  With respect 
to gauging ALBA’s prospects for success, it is important to clarify the distinctions and 
similarities of these two models, including the global political-economic contexts in 
which they emerged.  Below I highlight a number of these similarities and distinctions.  
I find that while ALBA does not have to face many of the same challenges that 
confronted ISI model, it does, however, share one important limitation: technological 
dependence.  Lastly, I discuss the increasing threat of US imperialism in an era of global 
peak-oil production. 
As we will recall, ISI projects depended heavily on foreign financing because the 
revenue generated from traditional exports was insufficient to sustain industrial 
development.  Coupled with this were the upheavals associated with the demise of the 
gold standard. The United States’ decision to abolish the gold standard allowed the dollar 
to float (often sporadically) against the world’s other trading currencies.  This had 
disastrous consequences on the ISI model of development.  As the value of the dollar 
increased, so did the cost of capital goods imported from abroad (i.e., industry and 
technology).   This produced a strain on current accounts, which ultimately resulted in a 
large scale economic imbalance for many Latin American nations (Gowan: 1999:48).  In 
order to continue with the development process under stable conditions, developing 
nations were obliged to borrow heavily from international financial institutions so as to 
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maintain a fixed exchange rate with the dollar (Gowan 1999).  Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s Latin American governments committed millions of dollars to defend their 
currencies against a rising dollar.  After the removal of international capital controls, the 
majority of the money used to service currencies came from private banks.  Unfortunately 
(for Latin American nations) private loans came with adjustable interest rates that 
fluctuated with changes in US short-term rates (Gowan 1999: 28).  Every time the Federal 
Reserve raised interest rates to curb inflation, the interest on Latin America’s private debt 
rose. To make matters worse, all of these events occurred in the context of the 1970s oil 
crisis, which was characterized by an unprecedented rise in the cost of oil.32   
Fortunately, many of the upheavals that the ISI model had to contend with are not 
relevant to ALBA’s development prospects.  Because of ALBA’s access to Venezuela’s 
oil revenue, development under the ALBA model does not currently depend on the IMF 
or US based financial institutions.  Also, rising oil prices will not stifle development as 
they did in the 1970s and 80s, but rather provide more financial resources for the 
development of ALBA programs and projects.  In addition, the US dollar does not pose 
the same threat for the ALBA model as it did for the ISI projects of the development era. 
Currently the US is running a trade deficit with a host of oil producing nations, including 
Venezuela. This has left Venezuela and others with substantial sums of US dollars to 
pursue national development agendas (Phillips 2008: 139).  Under this scenario, if the 
value of the dollar rises, so does the amount of revenue that Venezuela can direct toward 
                                                 
32 Despite these challenges, the ISI model was fairly successful in generating economic growth. Between 
1950-1980, average growth rates for the region exceeded 5 percent (Maddison 1995), and from 1970 -1979 
the average poverty rate fell by 40 percent (Bell Lara and Lopez 2006:26).    
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development projects; and if the dollar falls, then the price of oil climbs.  Neither case 
should thwart Venezuela’s ability to finance its development projects.  
 
Global Recession and Technological Dependence 
With respect to contemporary challenges that ALBA will have to confront, the 
current slowdown of the global economy poses a significant risk.  Oil prices have been on 
a steady decline since the eruption of the global financial crisis.  Speculators have been 
moving their money out of oil futures, as expectations of declining demand mount.  Since 
November, oil prices have steadily plummeted below the US$70 to US$90 mark that 
Chavez said could maintain current spending levels (Painter 2008a).  Oil analysts at 
Goldman Sachs have predicted that prices could drop as low as US$50 if the current 
recession continues (Painter2008a).  The question then becomes how long will Venezuela 
be able to finance ALBA’s ambitious programs and development projects in the face of 
dwindling oil profits.  According to Weisbrot and Ray (2008) even if oil drops to $50 per 
barrel, Venezuela would still run a BoP surplus until 2010 at its current annual import rate 
of 43.2 billion.  Moreover, even if Venezuela were to fall into a BoP deficit, the 
government has foreign reserves that exceed $40 billion and another $37 billion in other 
hard currency assets, thus providing an enormous cushion in the event that the 
government is forced to pursue deficit government spending (Weisbrot and Ray 2008:8).  
In any case, dwindling export revenue most certainly has serious implications for 
Venezuela’s ability to finance ALBA.  If prices fall below the projection mentioned 
above, ALBA’s financial resources will most certainly be at risk. Venezuela in 
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conjunction with Iran has spearheaded the effort to stop the fall of oil prices.  In October 
Venezuela and Iran successfully lobbied other members of OPEC to cut production by 
500,000 barrels a day, but the measure did little to stabilize oil prices.  OPEC has 
scheduled an emergency meeting in December and additional cuts are expected.   
The challenge that falling oil prices pose for ALBA is a symptom of a deeper 
structural problem: dependence on the import of technology and capital goods from 
developed nations.  As we will recall, technological dependence was also characteristic of 
ISI.  Under ISI, developing nations ran massive BoP deficits and accumulated 
considerable debt importing capital goods from developed nations.  This technology also 
came with royalty and patent stipulations that channeled much of the profit back to 
developed nations.  While currently ALBA does not have to borrow money to import 
capital goods, it does need to maintain healthy export revenues .The current economic 
recession threatens to undermine ALBA’s development agenda, as falling oil prices will 
leave Venezuela with less financial resources with which to purchase industrial 
necessities.  Moreover, this is a problem that cannot be overcome by diversifying exports. 
In the context of falling global demand and prolonged global economic downturn, the 
export of natural gas, or even industrial products from Grannacionales would undoubtedly 
face the same problems. In order to break the dependence on foreign export markets, 
ALBA nations must begin to develop their own capital goods sectors. This will also 
include developing the science and technology necessary for research and development.  
As Harry Magdoff (2003:130) once highlighted in a critique of ISI, “ [development 
strategies] must attack the central issue of developing an independent technological base 
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and an indigenous research and development capability for the generation of technology 
adapted to the specific needs of developing nations.” 
Currently, ALBA’s industrialization and infrastructure development still greatly 
depends on the import of technology and industry from developed nations.  If ALBA can 
successfully develop its own capital goods sector, dependence on foreign export markets 
can be broken, as ALBA nations will no longer need to maintain robust export sectors in 
order to get the foreign currency needed to import industrial necessities.  Moreover, this 
will allow ALBA nations to keep their abundant natural resources for their own energy 
and production needs.  But until this is achieved, ALBA’s development will be largely 
dictated by demand for its exports.    
 
US imperialism 
 US imperialism constitutes the most immediate threat to ALBA.  Given the 
significance of Venezuela’s membership in the ALBA alliance, the overthrow of the 
Chavez administration would likely throw the whole project into disarray. Indeed, the 
replacement of Chavez has been an important agenda item for Washington and the 
Venezuelan opposition. Beginning with its support for the 2002 coup attempt, the US 
government, along with the Venezuelan opposition, have devised a string of operations 
aimed at destabilizing Venezuela’s democratically elected government (Foster 2007, 
Gollinger 2006, Gollinger 2008 ). The corporate media (who were also instrumental 
assisting the 2002 coup plotters) have contributed by consistently stoking a “mood of 
violence” amongst the rightwing opposition (Gollinger 2006). 
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In 2006, the Council on Foreign Relations released a report entitled Living with 
Hugo.  The report addressed potential strategies that could be used to upset Chavez’s 
“anti-capitalist crusade.”   The report called for a long-term diplomatic effort to isolate the 
Venezuelan government by establishing “specific red lines” (determined by the United 
States and “regional leaders such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico”) that once 
crossed would bring about a “joint preventive response”.    The US, in tandem with 
regional leaders, would collectively determine “how to respond in the event that such red 
lines are crossed.”  The report specified that red lines could be drawn around (1) any 
attempt to alter the Venezuelan constitution; (2) Venezuelan support for destabilizing 
forces throughout the region; (3) a military relationship with a rogue state such as Iran 
(Lapper 2006).    
In 2007, one such red line was crossed, as the government pushed forward with a 
referendum to amend the Constitution.  Before the run up to the referendum, the 
Venezuelan government uncovered a confidential document sent from the US embassy to 
the CIA that revealed the depths of Washington’s covert operations.  The document 
elaborated the specificities of a secret plan called “Operation  Pincer” (OP) that was 
designed to delegitimate the results of the referendum and prevent the constitutional 
changes (Petras 2007).  The document described in detail the efforts aimed at infiltrating 
Chavez support groups in an attempt to influence the referendum vote.  According to 
James Petras (2007: 1), OP involved a two-part strategy, one part aimed at supporting a 
‘No’ vote and the other calling for the citizenry to reject the outcome and employ 
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violence, as they were expecting the majority of the citizenry to vote in favor of the 
constitutional changes. According to Petras (2007:1):    
The run up to the referendum involved running phony polls, attacking electoral 
officials, and running propaganda through the private media accusing the 
government of fraud… The key and most dangerous threats to democracy raised 
by the embassy memo point to their success in mobilizing private university 
students (backed by top administrators) to attack key government buildings 
including the Presidential Palace, Supreme Court, and the National Electoral 
Council.  The ultimate objective was to seize territorial and institutional base with 
the ‘massive support of the defeated electoral minority… backed by an uprising 
by oppositionists military officers principally the National Guard. 
 
Meanwhile, the private media did its part by calling on the Venezuelan citizenry to 
“rebel” against the government, and stop the constitutional changes “through any means 
possible”, according to Tibisay Lucena, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council President 
(Lendman 2007).  Although the referendum was voted down, the government was 
successful in maintaining stability and order during the aftermath of the vote. 
More recently, there has been an attempt to link President Chavez with the 
Colombian guerilla group the FARC, in the hope of labeling Venezuela as a terrorist state 
and undermine the government’s legitimacy internationally, perhaps establishing the basis 
for preemptive operations.  After a Colombian military raid on a FARC encampment 
inside the borders of Ecuador, Colombian President Uribe, Washington’s closest ally, 
announced that the Colombian military found evidence that Chavez and Ecuadorian 
President Rafael Correa were financially and militarily assisting the FARC.  The evidence 
consisted of documents found on laptop computers that were allegedly discovered at the 
FARC encampment.  The documents were purported to include information about 
financial and military agreements between the Colombian guerilla group and Chavez.  
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The computers were sent to the international police organization (INTERPOL) in order to 
validate Colombia’s claims.  However, all the analysis indicated was that the computers 
were not tampered with after the Colombian Military purportedly found them.  This, of 
course, in no way proves that the computers were not planted at the scene.  Interestingly, 
however, INTERPOL did find a number of documents on the computers that had been 
dated in the future (Suggett 2008a), but no official explanation was given. Ultimately, the 
“evidence” was not compelling enough to indict the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian 
governments.  Allegations were dropped and no official charges were ever filed.  Perhaps 
one reason that Colombia and the US did not pursue these claims was the overwhelming 
support for Venezuela and Ecuador by other Latin American nations.   The Organization 
of American States (OAS) condemned Colombia’s bombing raid into Ecuador.  All 
members with the exception of the US and Colombia explicitly denounced the incursion 
into Ecuador’s territory.   
 
Peak Oil and US Hegemony 
What accounts for the hostile nature of the US toward the Venezuelan 
government?  First of all, Venezuela’s many progressive projects no doubt pose a threat 
to the economic and political interest of the US. In some cases these projects, especially 
the move to build “21st Century Socialism,” point towards alternative forms of property 
relations as well as alternative modes of production and distribution that are not consistent 
with American global interest.  In many respects, Venezuela’s national and regional 
development agenda constitutes an ideological assault on the international capitalist order.  
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As historian David Schmitz (2006) has pointed out, “It was the threat of a successful 
socialist state in Chile that could provide a model for other nations that caused concern 
and led to American opposition.”  Venezuela no doubt poses a similar risk at a stage when 
many in the international community (especially in Latin America) are disenchanted with 
neoliberal-style capitalism. More directly, however, I believe that there is one issue 
resulting from Venezuela’s development agenda that poses a direct threat to American 
hegemony:  declining oil production.  Venezuela’s oil production has been gradually 
declining, along with many other oil producing states (Foster 2008:22). Of course, 
Venezuela’s production level will increase dramatically once the Oronoco Belt is tapped.  
However, it is expected that the majority of this oil will be allocated to China and India, 
the two largest up and coming oil consuming nations.  If this happens, the US will be left 
out in the cold during an era characterized by declining global oil production. A 
comprehensive assessment of “peak oil” production is beyond the scope of this project.  
However, in order to understand the United States’ stance against Venezuela, it is 
necessary to make clear the significance of declining oil production with respect to US 
energy security.   
 Beginning in 1998 a series of reports were released by oil industry representatives 
and US government officials on the state of US energy security (Campbell and Laherrere 
1998, Morse 1999, White House 2001).   A common theme in these reports was the 
concern over increasing foreign oil dependency and global “peal oil” production.  “Peak 
oil” is a term that refers to the point at which global oil production has reached its 
maximum, followed by a steady and permanent decline in output (Foster 2008).  Peak oil 
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is determined by both geological and technological limitations.  Once an oil well has been 
tapped, the rate of extraction steadily increases until the point at which the well is half 
empty.  Once the halfway mark is reached, the rate of extraction steadily declines, as it 
becomes harder to maintain the going rate of extraction the further down the oil is (Foster 
2008).  According to the Energy Watch Group, a large percentage of existing oil wells are 
currently running at peak production (EWG 2007). Coupled with this is the fact that the 
rate of new oil field discoveries has steadily declined, while the average size of newly 
discovered oil fields are much smaller (Foster 2008). Strategic energy initiatives have 
increasingly focused their attention on ways to boost global oil production, as to stabilize 
the rising price of oil.  In 2005, a report by the US Army warned: 
The doubling of oil prices from 2003-2005 is not an anomaly, but a picture of the 
future.  Oil production is approaching its peak; low growth in availability can be 
expected for the next 5 to 10 years.  As worldwide petroleum production peaks, 
geopolitics and market economies will cause even more significant price increases 
and security risks. (Fournier and Westervelt 2005) 
 
 Over the last decade, a number of reports have identified state owned oil 
companies as one of the most significant factors contributing to dwindling oil supply and 
rising costs.  In 2001, the James Baker III Institute cosponsored a study that noted that 
excess capacity had been wiped out due to oil producing states willingness to devote oil 
revenues to national development and social projects, as oppose to reinvesting into 
productive capacity.  Special emphasis was placed on the US assuming a greater role in 
the development of global oil reserves and the replacement of national oil companies 
(NOCs) with transnational oil companies, which would purportedly “inject a more 
competitive tenor to oil trade” (Morse 2001).  In 2006, the Center for Strategic 
 
98
International Studies (CSIS) issued a report that explicitly highlighted the international 
supply threat posed by Venezuelan State’s commitment to pursuing domestic and 
geopolitical goals with its oil revenues (Deutsch and Schlesinger 2006).   
 Perhaps the most explicit indictment of Venezuela came from another policy 
report issued by the James Baker III Institute in 2007.  The report stressed the growing 
concern over “Venezuela’s national development policy” and its willingness to pursue 
“social and cultural investment” over “commercial development” (James A. Baker III 
Institute 2007: 10-12).  The report emphasized the imperative of “breaking up” OPEC’s 
control over global oil production so that greater revenues could be directed toward 
production.  “If the United States were able to wish into existence a world that would 
favor its terms of trade, and super power status,” the report stated,  “all national oil 
companies would be privatized.”   
These reports demonstrate the urgency on the part of the US to secure and extend 
its control over global oil reserves. The looming threat of energy imperialism is 
something that Venezuela (and by extension, ALBA) will no doubt have to contend with 
for years to come.  The US has showed its willingness not only to act through covert 
means (as in Venezuela), but also through full scale military combat (as in Iraq), 
according to former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan (2007: 462-463).  
In his new book, Greenspan admitted that he was “saddened that it is politically 
inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: that the Iraq war is largely about 
oil.”  Greenspan went on to argue that the US occupation in Iraq should be understood 
along the lines of previous Western interventions in the region, such as CIA overthrow of 
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Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953, following the nationalization of Iran’s oil 
(Greenspan 2007:462-463).       
  The longevity of ALBA will depend on how Venezuela confronts US-led 
aggression.  The present strategy seems to be one of bolstering political, economic, and 
military ties with other world powers such as China Russia and Brazil, while fostering 
regional support from other Latin American nations. In November of 2008 Venezuela and 
Russia plan to embark on joint military exercises off of the coast of Venezuela.  This will 
undoubtedly escalate tensions between the US and Venezuela.  However, before 
Venezuela and Russia even announced such plans the US had already decided to 
recommission the 4th Fleet, a formidable line of US warships and submarines with nuclear 
armaments, to patrol along the Caribbean and South American coastline (Gragg 2008).   
Venezuela must find effective ways to counterbalance the military might of the 
US and Colombia, while also continuing to garner support from its allies in the region.  
The most concrete example of such an initiative has been the launching of the South 
American Defense Council by Venezuela and Brazil.  Initially, the US had requested to 
be involved but was denied.  According to Brazil’s defense minister, Nelson Jobim, the 
council will promote joint military training and defense bases, as well as push toward 
military industrial integration (Suggett 2008b).  Jobim stated that the main purpose of the 
council was to “dissuade” possible military incursions.  In order to develop ample 
capacity for dissuasion, Jobim insisted on the need to integrate and advance the region’s 
militaries.   
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Perhaps Latin America’s new defense council, in conjunction with the political 
and military support from other formidable world powers such as Russia, will provide 
sufficient dissuasion against military incursion from either the US or its ally, Colombia.  
With the threat of US military intervention effectively checked, Venezuela can continue 
to pursue more egalitarian modes of economic integration with its neighbors, both inside 
and outside of the ALBA model. 
ALBA, as a concrete model of development, may provide an opportunity for poor 
nations in the region to make meaningful strides towards development without 
compromising national sovereignty.  Under ALBA, states are not pressured to sell off 
public assets, expose their economies to foreign money speculators, or compromise 
national production by making local producers compete with highly subsidized 
international monopolies in order to secure markets or financial assistance. ALBA points 
toward a more egalitarian mode of economic integration, whereby states reclaim their 
sovereign right to direct national development agendas for the benefit and security of their 
citizenries.  Under ALBA’s framework, states still pursue economic gains through 
international trade but not under competitive conditions or at the expense of less 
developed nations.  Rather ALBA’s focus is on cooperation and complementarity.  Not 
only are ALBA nations heavily involved in joint efforts to develop strategic sectors of 
their economies (Grannacionales), they have also carefully designed mutually beneficial 
bartering agreements (TCP), and created a financial architecture that will facilitate such 
development (The Bank of ALBA).  Indeed the strong cooperative element in ALBA is 
what separates it from the nationalist development strategies of the ISI period.  By 
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collaborating in the areas of technology, finance, and trade, Latin American countries can 
for the first time begin to embark on a regional development project that is independent 
from foreign based transnationals, investors, and financers that have pulled so much 
wealth out of the region.   
The emergence of ALBA in the present juncture has an important symbolic 
significance. ALBA is perhaps the most inclusive and concrete alternative to the 
neoliberal order that has materialized.  Part of ALBA’s distinctiveness lies in the fact that 
it constitutes more than just a new mode of economic integration; it also has a strong 
human dimension, as healthcare and education make up a significant part of ALBA’s 
fundamental architecture.  For the first time some of the poorest peoples in the entire 
region have access to free healthcare and a college education. By proving that a state-
lead, non-competitive, mode of integration that focuses on human well-being is possible, 
ALBA not only serves as an example to other Latin American states but also to the rest of 















































Acuna, Carlos H, Sebastian Galiani, and Mariano Tommasi. 2007. “Understanding 
Reform: The case of Argentina.” In Fanelli, Jose M. 2007. Understanding Market 
Reforms in Latin America. Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Alarcon, Richard. 2007. “ALBA: A New Dawn in Latin America” Monthly Review 59,3: 
9-11. 
 
ALBA. 2004. ALBA Cardinal Principles.  Published in Spanish online at 
http://www.embavenez-us.org 
 




ALBA. 2006. ACUERDO PARA LA APLICACIÓN DE LA ALTERNATIVA 
BOLIVARIANA PARA LOS PUEBLOS DE NUESTRA AMÉRICA Y EL TRATADO 








ALBA. 2008. VI CUMBRE DEL ALBA. Published online at 
http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2668 
 
ALBA.2008a. Cumbre Presidencial, Soberanía y seguridad alimentaría: Alimentos para la 








Anderson, Tim. 2006. “Breaking Imperial Ties: Venezuela and ALBA”. Published online 
at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1675 
 
Arreaza, Teresa. 2004. “ALBA: Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the 




Balassa, B.G. Bueno, P.P. Kuczynski and M.H. Simonsen. 1986. Toward Renewed 
Economic Growth in Latin America. Washington D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics.  
 
Bancoex. 2004. “What is the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the 
Caribbean?” Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/344 
BBC. November 10, 2008. “Cuba and Russia Sign Trade Deals.” Published online at 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7719436.stm 
 
Bell Lara, Jose, Delia Luisa Lopez. 2007. “The Harvest of Neoliberalism.” In Dello 
Buono. Richard A. and Jose Bell Lara (eds.). 2007. Imperialism, Neoliberalism and 
Social Struggles in Latin America. Boston: Brill. 
 
Bello, Walden, Kamal Malhotra, Nicola Bullard, and Marco Mezzera. 2000. “ Notes on 
the Ascendancy of Speculative Capital.” In Bello, Walden, Nicola Bullard, Kamal 
Malhotra. 2000. Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulative Speculative Capital 
Markets. London/New York: Zed Books.   
 
Campbell, Colin and Jean H. Laherrere. 1998. “The End of Cheap Oil” Scientific 
American March 1998:78-83. 
 
Carlson, Chris. 2007. “ALBA Country Representatives Meet in Venezuela to Deepen 
Integration.” Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2505 
 
Carlson, Chris. 2007a. “Venezuela Begins Construction of Six New Hospitals”.  
Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2670 
 
Carlson, Chris. 2007b. “Cuba and Venezuela Deepen Alliance with More Accords”. 
Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2733 
 
Carlson, Chris. 2007c. “ALBA Country Representatives Meet in Venezuela to Deepen 
Integration”. Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2505 
 
Carlson, Chris. 2007d. “Venezuela to Carry Out “Natural Gas Revolution”. 
Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2607 
 
Carlson, Chris. 2007e. “ALBA Summit Creates New Model for Latin American 
Integration”. Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2362 
 
Carlson, Chris. 2007f. “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas Bank to be established 
this Year”. Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2590 
 
Cole, Don. 1996. “Economics 96/97.” Annual Editions. Guilford, Connecticut: Dushkin 




De La Barra, Ximena. 2007. “The Dual Debt of Neoliberalism.” in Dello Buono. Richard 
A. and Jose Bell Lara (eds.). 2007. Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in 
Latin America. Boston: Brill. 
 
De Oliveira, Fabricio Augusto, Paulo Nakatani. 2007. “The Brazilian Economy Under 
Lula: A Balance of Contradictions.” Monthly Review 58, 9: 39-49. 
 
Dello Buono. Richard A. and Jose Bell Lara (eds.). 2007. Imperialism, Neoliberalism and 
Social Struggles in Latin America. Boston: Brill. 
 
Deutsch, John and James R. Schlesinger. 2006. “National Security Consequences of US 
Oil Dependence” Council on Foreign Relations. Published online at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication//11683/ 
 
Dierckxsens, Wim. 2007. “Social Movements and the Capitalist Crisis: Towards a Latin 
American Alternative” in Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin 
America. Boston: Brill. 
 
Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1971. “The Structure of Independence.” Pp. 225-236 in K. T. Kan 
and Donald C. Hodges (eds.) Reading in the U.S. Imperialism. Boston: Extending 
Horizons. 
 
ECLAC. 1998. Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997-1998. 
Santiago, Chile: United Nations. 
 
ECLAC. 2001. Notas de la CEPAL, Santiago Chile, March. Referenced in Bell Lara, 
Jose, Delia Luisa Lopez. 2007. “The Harvest of Neoliberalism.” In Dello Buono. Richard 
A. and Jose Bell Lara (eds.). 2007. Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in 
Latin America. Boston: Brill. 
 
ECLAC. 2006.  “Trends in Poverty and Indigence, 1980-2006.” Published online at 
http://www.eclac.cl Dominguez, “ALBA”; Duncan Green. 2006. Faces of Latin America. 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 




Evans, Peter B. 1983.  “State and Local Multinational Capital in Brazil: Prospects for the 
Stability of the ‘Triple alliance’ in the Eighties.” in p.p. 137-157 Alvin So. Social Change 
and Development: Modernization Dependency, and World-System Theories. London: 




EWG 2007. Crude Oil: the Supply Outlook, October2007.  Published online at 
http://www.energywatchgroup.org/fileadmin/global/pdf/EWG-Oilreport-10-2007.pdf/ 
 
Fernandez-Kelly. 2007. “NAFA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in Global Trade 
and Development.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science. 610, 3. 
 
Foster, John Bellamy. 2007. “ The Latin American Revolt” Monthly Review 59, 3: 1-7.  
 
Foster, JohnBellamy.2008. “Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism” Monthly Review 60, 3: 12-
33. 
 
Fournier, Daniel and Eileen T. Westervelt. 2005. Energy Trends and Their Implications 
for Army Installation. Published online at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/challenges/overstretch/2005/09energytrends.pdf,vii 
 
Fox, Michael. 2006. “Defining the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas – ALBA”. 
Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1870 
 
Frenkel, Roberto. 2007. “Argentina’s Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies After the 
Convertibility Regime Collapse” Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2007. 
 
Garibaldi, J.A. 2007. “ A Common Thread? Democratic Facades, Institutional 
Governance, and Economic Reforms Outcomes in Mexico.” In Fanelli, Jose M. 2007. 
Understanding Market Reforms in Latin America. Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Golinger, Eva. 2006. The Chavez Code: Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela. 
Northampton Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press. 
 
Golinger, Eva. 2008. Bush Vs Chavez: Washington’s War on Venezuela. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
 
Gonzales, G. 2003. “Latin America: More Poverty, Fewer Social Services” Terra Viva 
Online, January 13.  Published online at http://www.ipsnews.net/fsm2003/eng/not1.shtnl 
 
Gowan, Peter. 1999. The Global Gamble. London: Verso.  
 
Gragg, Alan. 2008. “Navy Reestablishes U.S. 4th Fleet.” U.S. Naval Forces Southern 
Command Public Affairs.  Published online at 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=36606 
 




Harnecker, Marta. 2005. Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution: Hugo Chavez Talks 
to Marta Harnecker. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Harris and Azzi. 2006. “ ALBA-Venezuela’s Answer to “Free Trade”: the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas.” FOCUS on the Global South: Occasional Paper: 3. Brazil 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: University Press. 
 
Harvey, David. 2007. “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction” The Annals of the 
American Academy, 610, March 2007. 
 
Hattingh, Shawn. 2008. “ALBA: Creating a regional Alternative to Neoliberalism?” 
Published online at http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/hattingh07020.html 
 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1979. Law Legislation, and Liberty Vol. 3, the Political Order of a 
Free People. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.   
 
Hershberg and Rosen. 2006. Latin America After Neoliberalism: Turning the Tide in the 
21st Century. New York: New Press. 
 
Hoffman, Andre. 2000. The Economic Development of Latin America in the Twentieth 
Century. Great Britain: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.  
 
Howard, April. 2007. “Slaying Vampires: Chavez Proposes South American Energy 
Treaties”. Published online at http://upsidedownworld.org/main/index2.php?option=com 
_content& task=view&id=846&p. 
 
Hudson, Michael. 2006. Global Fracture: The New International Economic Order. New 
York: Harper and Row.  
 
International Development Bank.1990. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. 
Washington.1990. 
 
International Development Bank. 2000.  “ Inequality, Exclusion, and Poverty in Latin 
America and the Caribbean,” Referenced in “The Harvest of Neoliberalism.” In Dello 
Buono. Richard A. and Jose Bell Lara (eds.). 2007. Imperialism, Neoliberalism and 
Social Struggles in Latin America. Boston: Brill. 
 
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University.2007. “The Changing 
Role f National Oil companies in International Oil Markets” Baker Institute policy report 





Janicke, Kiraz. 2007a. “Venezuela Attends 4th Annual Petrocaribe Summit in Cuba”. 
Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3026 
 
Janicke, Kiraz. 2007b. “Chavez Announces Latin American Tour to Strengthen 




Kohl, Benjamin. 2002. “Stabilizing Neoliberalism in Bolivia: Popular Participation and 
Privatization.” Political Geography. 21 (2002) 449-472.  
 
Lapper, Richard. 2006. Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy Toward Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. 
Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2006, 3, 37. 
 
Lendman, Stephen. 2007.  “The Bank of the South: An Alternative to IMF and the World 
Bank Dominance” published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2770 
 
Maddison, Angus. 1995. Monitoring the World Economy: 1820-1992. Paris: OECD 
Development Centre.  
 
Magdoff, Harry. 2003. Imperialism Without Colonies. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Marques, Rosa Maria, Aquilas Mendes. 2007. “Lula and Social Policy in the Service of 
Financial Capital.” Monthly Review 58, 9: 22-31. 
 
Martinez, Nadia. 2007. “Latin America’s New Petro Politics”  
 
McMichael, Phillip. 1996. “Globalization: Myths and Realties.” Rural Sociology 61, 1.   
 
Montono, Ximena. 2006. “Diferencias entre los TLCs y el Tratado de los Pueblos – 
TCP”. Interview with Pablo Solon. Published on line at 
http://www.redem.buap.mx/alternativa.htm 
 
Morse, Edward. 1999. “A New Political Economy of Oil?” Journal of Intentional Affairs 
53, no.1:1-29 
 
Morse, Edward. 2001. Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century. Published 
online at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachements/Energy%20TaskForce.Pdf 
 
Painter, James. 2008. “China's growth key for Latin America” Published online at 
http://www.newsbbc.co.uk/2/hi.americas/7679471.stm 
  





Pearson, Tamara. 2008. “Venezuela Graduates 6,700 Professionals From Low-income 
Backgrounds.” Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3900 
 
Peet and Hartwick. 1999. Theories of Development. New York/ London: the Guilford 
Press.   
 
Petras, James. 2007. “CIA Venezuela Destabilization Memo Surfaces.” Published online 
at http://www.counterpunch.org/petras11272007.html 
  
Petras and Veltmeyer. 2001. Unmasking Globalization: The New Face of Imperialism. 
London: Zed Books; Halifax: Fernwood Books. 
 
Petras and Veltmeyer, and Vieux. 1997. Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin 
America. Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD.  
 
Phillips, Kevin. 2008. Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global 
Crisis of American Capitalism. New York: Viking. 
 
Prates, Daniela Magalhaes, Leda Maria Paulani. 2007. “The Financial Globalization of 
Brazil Under Lula.” Monthly Review 58, 9: 32-38. 
 
Prebisch, R. 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principle 
Problems. New York: United Nations. 
 
Prevost, Gary. Weber, Robert. 2002. “The Prospects for the Free Trade of the Americas in 
the Bush Administration.” In Prevost and Weber. 2002. Neoliberalism and 
Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Reisen, Helmut. 1985. Key Prices for Adjustment to Less External Indebtedness. Paris: 
OECD Development Centre.  
 
Reygadas, Luis. 2006.  “Latin America: Persistent Inequality and Recent 
Transformations” in Hershberg and Rosen 2006. Latin America After Neoliberalism: 
Turning the Tide in the 21st Century. New York/London: New Press. 
 
Rist, Gilbert. 1997. The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. 
London: Zed Books.   
 
Rodrik, Dani. 1988. “Globalization, Social Conflict, and Economic Growth” (Prebisch 
Lecture) The World Economy 21, 2. 
 
Romero, Simon. 2007. “Brazil’s Objections Slow Chavez’s Plan for a Regional Bank.” 




Rostow, W.W. 1956. “The Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth.” The Economic journal 
66, 261, pp. 25-48. 
 
Rostow, W.W. 1959. “The Stages of Economic Growth.” The Economic History Review 
12, 1. 
 
Rostow, W.W. 1964. “The takeoff into Self-Sustained Growth.” Pp. 285-300 in Amitai 
Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.) Social Change. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Roy, Jose. 2008. “Cuba Discovers Black Gold Treasure Offshore” published online at 
http://www.toboc.com/tradenews.aspx?tradeid=1207 
 
SAPRIN. 2004. Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report. London/New York: Zed 
Books. 
 
Schmitz, David. 2006. The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Scott, Christopher. 1996.  “The Distributive Impact of the New Economic Model in 
Chile.” In Prevost and Weber. 2002. Neoliberalism and Neopanamericanism: The View 
from Latin America.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
So, Alvin. 1990. Social Change and Development: Modernization Dependency, and 
World-System Theories. London: Sage Publications.  
 
Soederberg, Susanne. 2004. The Politics of the New International Financial Architecture: 
Reimposing Neoliberal Domination in the Global South. London/New York: Zed Books.    
 
Spencer, Herbert. 1861. Principles of Biology. Haddonfield, NJ: Ross and Perry. 
 
Stedile, Joao Pedro. 2007. “The Neoliberal Agrarian Model in Brazil.” Monthly Review 
58, 9: 50-54. 
 
Suggett, James. 2008. “ALBA Summit in Venezuela Responds to World Food Crisis and  
Bolivian Crisis.” Published online at http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3380 
 
Suggett, James.2008a. “Interpol Clarifies it Never Determined Authenticity of Laptops 
that Implicate Venezuela.” Published online at 
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3547 
 
Suggett, James. 2008b. “Venezuela and Brazil Advance on South American Defense 




Thornton, Daniel. 1999.  “Nominal Interest Rates:  Less Than Zero.” Monetary Trends.  
Published online by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/mt/ 1990101/cover.pdf  
 
Vanden, Harry E. 2002. “The Effects of Globalization and Neoliberalism in Central 
America: Nicaragua and Costa Rica.” In Prevost and Weber. 2002. Neoliberalism and  
Neopanamericanism: The View from Latin America.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
  
Veltmeyer, Henry. 2007. On the Move: Politics of Social Change in Latin America. New 
York: Broadview Press.  
 
Veltmeyer, Henry, James Petras.2001. Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st 
Century. New York. Palgrave Macmillan.   
 
Veltmeyer, Henry, James Petras, and Steve Vieux. 1997. Neoliberalism and Class 
Conflict in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective on the Political Economy of 
Structural Adjustment. New York. Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Vilas, Carlos M. 2007. “Neoliberal Meltdown and Social Protest: Argentina 2001-2002.” 
In  Dello Buono. Richard A. and Jose Bell Lara (eds.). 2007. Imperialism, Neoliberalism 
and Social Struggles in Latin America. Boston: Brill. 
 
Villarreal, Rene. 1990. “The Latin American Strategy of Import Substitution: Failure or 
Paradigm for the Region.” In Gereffi, Garry, Donald Wyman. 1990. Manufacturing 
Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Venezuelan and Cuban Delegations. 2005. “Final Declaration from the First Cuba-
Venezuela Meeting for the Application of the ALBA”. Published online at 
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1097 
 
Venezuelan Embassy. 2008. “Fact Sheet: Arbitration between ExxonMobil and 




Weisbrot, Mark. 2006. “Latin America: The End of an Era.” International Journal of 
Health Services. Vol. 36, No. 4 (2006). 
 
Weisbrot, Mark and Rebecca Ray.2008. “Oil Prices and Venezuela’s Economy.” 






White House. 2001. National Energy Policy. Published online at  
http:// www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf 
 







































Appendix 1 Grannacionales of ALBA 
 
Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Dominica 
 
• Operation Miracle - ophthalmology services that are provided free of charge to ALBA   
   citizenries  
 
• Barrio Adentro - basic medical care services that are provided free of charge to ALBA  
   citizenries 
 
•  Mission Robinson I - literacy program provided free of charge to ALBA citizenries. 
 
• Mission Robinson II - elementary education program provided free of charge to ALBA   
   citizenries. 
 
• Mission Ribas - higher education program provided free of charge to ALBA citizenries.  
 
• PETROALBA – a multilateral oil exploration and extraction company that will be run  
   by ALBA countries for the purposes of exploring and extracting oil in Venezuela’s  
   Oronico Oil Belt. 
 
• A multi lateral energy Grannacionale that covers the areas of oil, gas, refining,     
   petrochemicals, infrastructure development, transport, storage, distribution, electricity,  
   alternative energy and shipping. 
 
 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Dominica 
 
• A hydropower plant in Dominica between Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Dominica. 
 
 
Venezuela and Nicaragua 
• A joint oil refinery 
 
• A joint thermal power plant  
 
• An underwater fiber optic system connecting Venezuela and Nicaragua 
 
 
Cuba and Venezuela 
 
• The renovation of the Camilo Ceinfeugos oil refinery in Cuba  
 
•  A joint oil refinery  
 
•  A joint oil exploration venture in Cuban territories  
 




• A joint steel industry  
 
• A joint ship building industry  
 
• An underwater fiber optic system connecting Cuba and Venezuela 
 
• A joint airline industry 
 
 
Venezuela and Bolivia 
 
• Two joint natural gas extraction plants 
 
•  A joint thermal power plant 
 
• A joint asphalt industry 
 
• A joint exploration of four of Bolivia’s gas fields. 
 
•  A joint oil refinery  
 
•  A joint oil exploration venture in Cuban territories  
 
• A joint cement industry  
 
• A joint steel industry  
 
• A joint ship building industry  
 
• An underwater fiber optic system connecting Cuba and Venezuela 
 
• A joint airline industry 
 
• Two joint natural gas extraction plants 
 
•  A joint thermal power plant 
 
• A joint asphalt industry 
 







Appendix 2 TCP Agreements of ALBA 
 
Venezuela to Cuba 
 
• Technology Transfers in the energy sector 
 
• The removal of all bilateral tariff and non-tariff barriers on Cuban exports to Venezuela 
 
•  Finance for productive projects in the energy sector, electricity industry, and    
    agriculture. 
 
•  Finance for the renovation of infrastructure including: road construction, port    
   development, and aqueduct and sewer renovation. 
 
•  Subsidized oil at a minimum of $27 per barrel plus market premiums. 
 
 
Cuba to Venezuela 
 
• The removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers on Venezuelan imports. 
 
•  Tax exemptions on both state and private capital investments. 
 
•  Barrio Adentro – free general health care services provided to the Venezuelan  
   citizenry by some 30,000 Cuban doctors scattered throughout Venezuela.  
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